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BEAR'S LODGE OR DEVILS TOWER: INTER-
CULTURAL RELATIONS, LEGAL PLURALISM,
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SACRED
SITES ON PUBLIC LANDS*
Lloyd Burtont and David Ruppertt
INTRODUCTION
Seven young girls strayed from camp and were chased
by bears. As the bears were about to catch them they
sought refuge on a low rock about three feet in height.
One girl prayed for the rock to take pity on them. As a
result the rock began to grow skyward pushing the girls
out of reach of the bears. The bears jumped and
scratched at the rock [giving it its present columnar char-
acter]. The young girls are said to be still in the sky [and
became the seven stars the pleiades]. 1
Some 60 million years ago, great Earth stresses began to
deform the crust of the continent, resulting in the up-
lifting of the Rocky Mountains and Great Plains region.
As the surface rock layers began to crumple and fault,
magma from deep inside the Earth welled up into result-
ing gaps and fissures... The Missouri Buttes and Devils
Tower... are believed to be necks of extinct volcanoes.
Geologic evidence indicates the Missouri Buttes formed
first in two separate eruptions. The magma hardened
* An earlier version of this paper was presented in June, 1998, at the annual meeting of
the Law and Society Association, Aspen, Colorado.
t Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, Univer-
sity of Colorado at Denver.
tt Regional Anthropologist, Intermountain Region Support Office, National Park Ser-
vice; Adjunct Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of Colorado at Denver.
1 This is a summary of a Kiowa creation story, as relayed in RAY H. MA'risoN, DEvILS
TOWER NAnONAL MONUMENT, A IhSTORY, 3-4 (1956). Mattison notes that this story was
published in the SutDazcE TIMES, Nov.10, 1927 and reprinted in the RocKY MouNTAN
NEws, July 24, 1927. The phrase Mateo Teepee, or Mato Tipi, of Lakota origin, usually trans-
lated as Bear's Lodge or Bear's Teepee, is often used to refer to the American Indian name of
the Tower. The name for the Tower differs by tribe: the Kiowa refer to the Tower as T'sou'a'e
("aloft on a rock"); the Cheyenne refer to the Tower as Na Kovea ("Bear's Lodge"). See
Jeffrey R. Hanson & Sally Chirinos, Ethnographic Overview and Assessment of Devils Tower
National Monument, Wyoming, Denver- National Park Service, Intermountain Region Cultural
Resource Selections No. 9 (1997).
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plugging the plumbing underneath. A third eruption to
the southeast resulted in Devils Tower.2
Offered above are two creation stories about the same landmark
from two very different cultures. They begin this article because they
demonstrate the interplay of forces at work in the discussion and debate
over appropriate care of sites on public lands thought to be sacred by
indigenous peoples.
One way to comparatively understand these two accounts is from
the perspective of scientific rationalism. The two tales both describe the
materialization of the same natural phenomenon; they are mutually ex-
clusive in all their particulars; and an analysis of the available evidence
will determine which one is true or correct. But there are other ways to
view this apparent conflict between the stories. One alternative is to per-
ceive them as simultaneously occurring differences in realms of know-
ing, just as spiritual and rational dimensions simultaneously co-exist in
the consciousness of most human beings. Yet another alternative is to
acknowledge that the stories reflect each culture's attempt to ascribe
meaning to and better understand the significance of the unique monolith
that is their subject. The one is intimate, personal, and intuitive; the
other is dispassionate, removed, and analytical. Thus, the two cultures
perceptually construct the landmark in two very different ways: as a nat-
ural cathedral through one cultural lense, and as a geologic curiosity and
rock climber's playground through the other.3
Early on, contrasting cultural perspectives carried over into the
naming of the place. In accordance with the first of the creation stories
opening this article, to the Lakota and some other nearby tribes, this was
"Bear's Lodge," 4 the site at which to save them in a contest with a natu-
2 GREG BEAUoNT, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK No. 111, DEVuLS TOWER CH. 2
(1984).
3 We acknowledge here that we are making something of an overstatement in order to
make a point. There may well be some members of local tribes who are not imbued with, or
deeply moved by, the significance their tribe's spiritual leaders ascribe to the site, just as there
may be members of traditional Euro-American religions who clearly see in such landmarks the
handiwork of their Creator, and those of other spiritual orientations who experience some form
of transcendence in the presence of such natural features.
4 The story given above is from the Kiowa oral tradition. A variant of this is another
Kiowa story that involves two sisters, one a girl-bear who mistreated her sister. See Weston
LaBarre, Origin Story: The 10 Medicines and the Bear Society, in NoTEs ON KiowA ETHNoG-
RAPY (Santa Fe Laboratory of Anthropology, Expedition of 1935 (n.d.), papers of Weston
LaBarre, typescript of student notes, on file with the Kiowa Tribal Environmental Program).
Seven brothers of these sisters came to the aid of the mistreated girl. In an attempt to help
their sister and protect her from the bear-girl, the seven brothers called upon a rock for help.
The rock told the boys to circle it four times and then come up on top. When they did this, the
rock grew upwards. The bear-girl made a lunge for the seven brothers and missed the top by
inches, fell to the bottom, and scratched the rock's face. In this version, the seven brothers
became seven stars. See id.
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ral foe, Earth's children were lifted into the heavens. It is a portal of
entry into a welcoming universe (presaging a recent similar analogy to
the butte as an inter-galactic place of peaceable "close encounters").
But to the Euro-American settler culture, which at mid-nineteenth
century still tended to fear natural forces and to see wilderness as an
ungodly chaotic domain to be tamed and subdued,5 a more fitting
designation was "Bad God's Tower," or the "Devils Tower,' 6 an impre-
Mattison, see supra note 1, at 4, also notes that the Cheyenne version of the origin of the
Tower is quite different. The Cheyenne origin story tells of seven brothers, one who had the ill
fortune of having his wife carried off by a bear to his cave. See id. The youngest brother
instructs the others to make four arrows, while he transforms himself into a gopher and digs
into the bear's cave. While the bear is asleep, he succeeds in escaping from the cave with his
older brother's wife. The bear awakens and gathers other bears of his clan to give chase. The
youngest brother, who had great power, always carried a small rock with him. He took the
rock in his hand and sang to it four times. When he finished, the rock had grown to the size
the Tower is today. The bear attacked the Tower, leaving the scratch marks that are visible
today. See iL
Other tribes have similar origin stories related to the Tower. The Crow version of the
story tells of two girls who were attacked by a bear while playing on a rock. See Hanson &
Chirinos, supra note 1, at 19 (reviewing additional stories collected by others from the North-
ern Cheyenne and the Arapaho); see also DICK STONE, IsTORY OF DEVILS TowER, 1804-1934
(microfilm on file at Wyoming State Archives, Museums and Historical Department, Chey-
enne); Mary Alice Gunderson, 1988 Devils Tower Stories, in HISTORY OF DEvas TowER,
1804-1934 (Glendo, Wyoming: High Plains Press), cited in David R. M. White, Naming Bear
Lodge: Ethnotoponymy and the Devils Tower National Monument, Wyoming (report Prepared
for the National Park Service, Intermountain Region, Denver, 1998) at 28-51. The Great Spirit
saved them by causing the rock to grow to its present size carrying the girls aloft. See Hanson
& Chirinos, supra note 1, at 19. Hanson and Chirinos also link Lakota stories regarding the
Tower to Lakota cosmology, and they review ethnographic accounts by others pointing to the
importance of the Black Hills, and specifically to the Tower, as a place where traditional
Lakota religious activities took place in the past, and continue to take place today. See Hanson
& Chirinos, supra note 1, at 25-29.
5 See generally RODERICK NASH, WILDNuss AsM THE AMmucAN M, (1967).
6 In 1857, Lieutenant G.K. Warren and F.V. Hayden passed through the country and
caught sight of "Bear's Lodge" to the north of their travels from Fort Laramie to explore the
Black Hills. See MAnrsoN, supra note 1, at 4-5. In 1875, Colonel Richard Dodge, com-
mander of a military escort for a U.S. Geological Survey party, took special note of the Tower.
In his 1876 book, The Black Hills, he identifies the name of the Tower as "Devils Tower,"
explaining that the Indian name for the Tower was 'The Bad God's Tower." See MATTISON,
supra note 1, at 5.
A bill was introduced in the 104th Congress by Wyoming representative Barbara Cubin
to ensure retention of the name "Devils Tower" for the monument. See H.R. 4020, 104th
Cong. (1996). This bill did not pass. Subsequently, Representative Cubin introduced another
bill to preclude the National Park Service, or any other agency, from taking action to change
the name to anything other than "Devils Tower." See H.R. 129, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill
also did not pass. Both bills were the result of rumors that there were efforts, at the time, to
change the name of the monument to something more in keeping with tribal cultures.
Although the title of this article alludes to cultural conflict over the name of the site, that
particular dispute is not our subject. One of the authors of this article-the academic-usually
prefers a hybrid bi-cultural name in referring to contested sites. But the other-the federal
government employee who occasionally works in a facilitative capacity-does not wish to
take sides on such a contentious political issue. The aesthetic concerns of the former author
therefore yield to the professional status concerns of the latter. In this article, the name used to
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cise translation of another Indian name. Although the Indian name
"Bear's Lodge" and the Anglo appellation "Devils Tower" were both
used in the late nineteenth century in various government reports, the
latter name stuck and was used in President Theodore Roosevelt's 1906
Proclamation, naming it the nation's first national monument,7 under the
authority of the Antiquities Act Congress had adopted just three months
earlier.8
Perceptual contrasts can exist not only between distinct culture
groups, but also within and between governmental institutions in the
same culture, which brings us to the research reported in this article. Our
subject is the law and policy of sacred site management on public lands,
which is best understood as divisible into two closely related sub-topics.
The first is procedures for the management of sites (held sacred by indig-
enous peoples) on public lands by federal agencies entrusted with the
care of those lands on behalf of all the peoples of the United States. The
second is review of agency decision-making on sacred site management
by the federal courts. Our means of contributing to knowledge of this
subject is the presentation of an in-depth case study of cultural and legal
conflict over the management of the Devils Tower National Monument
by the National Park Service ("NPS")-especially its efforts to balance
the cultural preservation needs of tribes who hold the site sacred with the
legal and economic interests of Euro-American commercial climbing
guides who may view the Tower quite differently.
Earlier, we described different ways of understanding the two crea-
tion stories that open this article. One way of viewing them is as mutu-
ally incompatible accounts that cannot simultaneously be taken as true or
correct. However, they could also be understood as mutually accommo-
dative perspectives that can each be deemed valid within their respective
realms of understanding. As we will see below, the same is true of the
governmental institutions of the dominant culture that now have over-
sight authority for management of this, the United States' oldest national
monument, as well as for many other sites on federal public lands that
indigenous peoples have identified as having particular ceremonial sig-
nificance in the perpetuation of their cultural heritage.
Our own story begins with an ethnohistory of the Devils Tower site,
followed by a description of the NPS's efforts to accommodate compet-
ing interests in the derivation of its climbing management plan. Follow-
ing that is an overview of the broader legal context within which these
actions were taken. We discuss two kinds of lenses through which vai-
refer to the monument will be that ascribed to it when it was first established as a national
monument.
7 See Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906).
8 See Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431-433 (1906).
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ous federal courts have viewed discretionary decisionmaking by govern-
ment agencies responsible for factoring indigenous cultural concerns into
policy implementation decisions. One lens is explicitly reductionist and
binary; it perceives all spiritually implicated indigenous interests exclu-
sively in First Amendment terms. Spiritual dimensions of tribal life are
seen as structurally separable from other elements of indigenous culture
in this mode of constitutional discourse, and deity-associated rituals are
accorded roughly the same status as a Catholic mass or Protestant prayer
meeting. Under this first view, tribal spiritual life receives no greater
(and sometimes far less) deference than that of the Baptists or Buddhists,
and agency management actions are judicially viewed solely in terms of
whether they impermissably burden the free exercise of tribal "religion,"
or defer to indigenous management preferences to the extent that they
impermissibly establish tribal "religion."
On the other hand, the other judicial view recognizes that, as distin-
guished from the atomistic structuring of U.S. society into separate boxes
labeled "religion," "culture," and "education," in most traditional indige-
nous societies in North America, these are all utterly interdependent,
each having little meaning without the other. To attempt such separation
is like removing all the blood from a living body and then wondering
why it no longer lives. The judicial approach from this other view has
been to support the agencies' recognition of indigenous societies as being
structurally distinct and different from the dominant culture, and to ac-
cord the agencies far greater deference in their efforts to simultaneously
accommodate divergent cultural perspectives in sacred site manage-
ment.9
After a discussion and critique of the consultation process leading
up to management plan derivation and the approach taken by a U.S. Dis-
trict Court (in Wyoming) in handling this dispute, we move from retro-
spective to prospective analysis. The article closes with policy
recommendations concerning inter-cultural consultation and public par-
ticipation in formulating management plans for sacred sites on all public
lands; and with recommendations as to how federal courts can use a
more pluralist perspective in reviewing the federal agency practice of
inter-cultural conciliation in the management of sacred places.
9 Early sociologists, such as Emile Durkhiem, viewed religion as a reification of society
itself. See EmnL DuRKmm,THB ELEMENTARY FoRms OF RELIGIOUS LIn (1912). This view
has been echoed, to some extent, in the comparative anthropological literature, which shows
statistical relationships between a cultural group's political economy, or its socialization prac-
tices, and the form its religious beliefs and practices exhibit. See Guy SwANsoN, THE BImT
OF THE GODS: Tim OIIGIn OF PRImITVE BELmFs (1960); ANTHONY WALLACE, RELIGION: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ViEw (1960); MARvIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1991); Robert
LeVine, Witchcraft and Co-Wife Proximity in Southwestern Kenya, 1 ETHNOLOGY 39 (1962).
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I. DEVILS TOWER: PAST AND PRESENT
A. ETHNOHiSTORY
A recently published assessment of the ethnohistoric landscape of
Devils Tower points to the fact that the Black Hills in general, and the
Tower itself, were the overlapping traditional territories of many Indian
tribes of the Plains.10 According to Jeffrey R. Hanson and Sally Chiri-
nos, at least six tribes have varying degrees of cultural affiliation with the
Tower." Archaeological evidence establishes the presence of bands of
the Eastern Shoshone in the Bighorn-Powder River area (Southeastern
Montana) in 1500 AD, while later sites display their presence in northern
Wyoming into the eighteenth century. 12 At the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, historic records indicate the presence of Shoshone bands
living with or near the Crow at the confluence of the Bighorn and Sho-
shone rivers. 13 Although originating from farther west, Shoshone use ar-
eas may have expanded and contracted depending on relationships with
nearby tribes. Contemporary interviews with Shoshone representatives
indicate a strong traditional association between the tribe and the
Tower. 14 The Eastern Shoshone today are confined to the Wind River
Reservation in west-central Wyoming.
Oral traditions from the Crow and the Hidatsa tribe confirm that the
Crow were once part of the Hidatsa Tribe, who lived in farming villages
along the Missouri River. 15 Separation from the Hidatsa and migrations
across the plains (perhaps more than one) brought the Crow to their pres-
ent location on the Montana/Wyoming border by the late prehistoric or
the early historic period. 16 Like their Shoshone neighbors and other
tribes in the area, the Crow adapted to the Plains as equestrian bison
hunters and ranged far and wide to hunt and trade. 17 Although the Crow
use area was to the west of the Tower, Hanson suggests that travel to and
from Mandan and Hidatsa territories to the east would certainly have
brought the Crow into close contact with the Tower. 18 He also cites
10 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1.
I1 See id
12 See idt at 7.
13 See Jeffrey R. Hanson, Ethnohistoric Problems in the Crow-Hidatsa Separation, 20
ARcHAEoLoGY IN MoNr. 73, 82 (1979).
14 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1, at 7.
15 See id. at 9.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id at 9-11.
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Stone19 and Gunderson2° showing that the Crow were familiar enough
with Devils Tower to encode it into their oral tradition.
Although the Kiowa today live in Oklahoma, their oral traditions of
past migration place them in the Black Hills and nearby areas.2 ' Hanson
and Chirinos cite others who indicate that the Kiowa were in the Black
Hills and Devils Tower area during the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. 22 That the Kiowa encoded the Tower in their oral tradi-
tion has long been known, and it is the Kiowa story mentioned
previously that has been used by the NPS to explain Indian affiliation
with the Tower.23
The tribes expressing the strongest affiliation with the Tower and
the surrounding area are the Northern Cheyenne, who today reside on the
Northern Cheyenne Reservation in southeastern Montana, and the
Lakota, the largest of the Sioux bands now residing on the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation in South Dakota.24 Numerous historic sources place
both the Cheyenne and the Lakota in the general region of the Black
Hills in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.25 Through oral tradition,
the Lakota share with other tribes the general features of the story of the
Tower's origins and consider the entire Black Hills region a sacred place
as the origin of their people. The Northern Cheyenne share the view of
the Tower as a sacred place and associate important culture heroes with
both the Tower and with nearby Bear Butte.26
Consultation with a number of tribal groups since Hanson's
ethnohistoric work has revealed potential for more tribal groups to be
added to the list of those having affiliation with the Tower.2 7 Although
research has not been conducted to document and verify these additional
tribal affiliations, it is clear that the Tower has played a role in the tradi-
tional belief systems of a number of American Indian tribes. The fluid
nature of tribal territorial boundaries over time no doubt brought many
tribes into contact with the Tower itself and/or allowed the sharing of
oral traditions between tribal groups. Continuing consultation with rep-
19 See id. Stone's work is a compilation of general information, interviews, and corre-
spondence regarding Indian recollections and oral traditions as they relate to the Devils Tower.
Hanson and Chirinos, supra note 1, at 10, note that this compilation was made in the early
twentieth century.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 19-20; see also White, supra note 4, at 33-34 (a more complete review of the
versions of the Kiowa story).
24 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1.
25 See id.
26 See iL
27 This information is derived from notes taken at a consultation meeting between Indian
tribal representatives and the Devils Tower superintendent and staff from 1995 to 1998, which
are on file at park headquarters [hereinafter Consultation meeting notes].
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resentatives of a number of Plains Indian tribes makes it clear that the
character of the cultural landscape surrounding the Tower is complex and
must be viewed with an eye to the nature of Indian tribal histories, ways
of life, oral traditions, and religious beliefs.28
Aside from the oral traditions and variety of stories collected over
the years by anthropologists, the Tower Monument staff have in recent
years witnessed evidence that ritual activity by American Indians at the
Tower continues to the present day. 29 Prayer offerings (e.g., tobacco or
sage wrapped in brightly colored ribbon) have been found throughout the
Tower grounds.30 These ritual activities are described as very private in
character and go largely unseen or unnoticed by the public and monu-
ment staff when they occur.31 In addition to this private activity, larger,
more public ritual celebrations have been held at the monument. Seg-
ments of the contemporary Lakota have sponsored a Sun Dance at the
Tower each year for the past decade.32 The variety of aboriginal origin
stories and the continuance of both private and more public ceremonies
at the Tower attest to the significant role the Tower has played, and con-
tinues to play, in the traditional and contemporary religious life of many
Indian people.
The earliest records of Euro-Americans in the region come from
trappers and government sponsored expeditions.33 Many of these early
visitors to the area note the Black Hills in their records, but do not specif-
ically identify the Devils Tower.34 The earliest mention of the Hills
came from the La Verendrye brothers, who travelled up the Missouri
through the Black Hills as early as 1743. 35 Lewis and Clark made refer-
ence to the Black Hills (Cout Noir) during their expedition, but they did
not mention the Tower.36 The earliest reference to the Tower comes from
a map of uncertain date and authorship. The map is thought to have been
produced by a fur trapper named John Dougherty sometime between
28 See id.
29 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1; see also Consultation meeting notes, supra note
27.
30 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1.
31 See id.
32 See Devils Tower National Monument permit records that are on file at park
headquarters.
33 See MATrsON, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also White, supra note 4, at 14-20.
34 See MATrrSON, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also White, supra note 4, at 14-20.
35 See THOMAS ODELL, MATO PAHA: THE STORY OF BEAR BuTrE, BLACK HILLs
LANDMARK AND INDIAN SHINE: ITS SCENIC, HIsTORIC, AND SCmNrruC UNIQUEESs (1942);
G. H. Smnr, THE ExPLORATIONS OF Tim LA VRnmEDYaS IN TE NORTHERN PLAINs, 1738-
1743 (1980); Ralph Ehrenberg, Exploratory Mapping of the Great Plains Before 1800, in
MAPPING THE NoRTH AMEmicAN PLAINs 3 (F.C. Luebke et al. eds., 1987).
36 See THE ORIGINAL JouRNALS OF THE Lawis AND CLARK ExPEDrnONs (R.G. Thaites
ed., 1959); J.L. Allen, Patterns of Promise: Mapping the Plains and Prairies, in MAPPING THE
NORTH AMERIcAN PLAiNs, supra note 35, at 41-62.
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1810 and 1814. The crudely hand-drawn map indicates two concentric
circles with a dot in the middle, and the legend "Devils Mountain" ap-
pears alongside the circles. This feature is placed east of the headwaters
of the Little Missouri River and north of the Cheyenne River.37
Later references to the Tower come from explorers visiting the area
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Lieutenant Colonel R.I.
Dodge,38 in a 1876 publication, refers to the Tower as "Bad God's
Tower," which may have been a faulty translation of Indian names for
the place. Other visitors to the region make note of the Tower, but indi-
cate names that more directly reflect Indian names. For example,
Coulton and Coulton39 refer to the Tower as "Bear's Lodge." This name
is also used by Gillespie40 and Smith.4' V.L. Pirsson42 uses the Indian
name "Mato Teepee," as do I.C. Russel 43 and Thomas Jagger.44 How-
ever, the name "Devils Tower" seems to have stuck and was used in the
Presidential Proclamation that established the Tower as a national monu-
ment in 1906.45
B. DEVELoPMENTs iN T= BEAR'S LODGE/DEVILS TOWER CoNF'IcT
1. Process, Design and Implementation.
It is a truism that the American public has discovered the vast po-
tential for the recreational use of public lands. All manner of recrea-
tional activities on federal and state lands has seen a dramatic increase
over the past few decades. One of these activities has been the increased
37 Interview with Dr. David White, Applied Cultural Dynamics, in Santa Fe, N.M. (Nov.
11, 1997) (referring to Linda R. Zelmer, Close Encounters: Mapping Devils Tower (unpub-
lished draft manuscript on file with author)). This map was retrieved from the National
Archives by Zellmer (Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Record Group 92,
Post and Reservation File, Map 281). Map inscriptions await hand-writing analysis, as it is
speculated that notes on the map may be from the hand of William Clark, of the Lewis and
Clark expedition.
38 See White, supra note 4, at 22.
39 G.W. CourLTON & C.B. COULTON, Coulton's Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, in
CouLToN's GENEmA ATLAs OF THE WORLD (1881).
40 MAJOR G.L. GILLEsPIE, U.S. WAR DP'T, MAP OF YELLowsToNE AND MIssouRI Rrv-
E AND Tfmm TRIau-rAIaEs (1876) (revising and enlarging the map from the explorations of
Captain W.F. Raynolds and First Lieutenant H.E. Maynadier, 1859-1860).
41 D.N SMmI, BLACK HILLs MAP INCLUDING NEBRASKA AND PART OF DAKOTA, Wyo-
MING, COLORADO, AND KANsAs (1876).
42 L.V. Pirsson, Description of the Character of the Igneous Rocks Making Up Mateo
Teepee and the Little Missouri Buttes, 47 AM. J. ScI. 341 (1894).
43 I.C. Russell, Igneous Intrusions in the Neighborhood of the Black Hills of Dakota, 4 J.
GEOLOGY 25, 27, 28, 31-35, 41 (1896).
44 THoMAs JAGGER, LAccOLrrHs OF THE BLACK HILLS (Twenty-First Annual Report of
the U.S. Geological Survey to the Secretary of the Interior, Vol. M, 1901).
45 See id
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use of public lands for recreational rock climbing.46 Most agencies
charged with managing lands were ill prepared to deal with the increases
in rock climbing since it has been a relatively recent development on the
recreational front.47 In 1992, the NPS, recognizing the increase in climb-
ing and the potential impacts this activity could have on the natural and
cultural resources of protected areas, directed those parks with significant
numbers of climbers to prepare plans providing a general framework for
the management of climbing activities.48 The goals of these plans would
be to examine the appropriateness of climbing in specific parks areas,
provide an assessment of impacts that climbing could have on natural
and cultural resources, and outline management strategies and actions
that could be used to lessen these impacts. In response, most national
parks applied the agency's customary public planning process and pro-
duced useful and effective plans within a short period.49
Construction of a climbing management plan for the Devils Tower
National Monument was not a straightforward endeavor. As indicated
earlier in this article, a number of factors indicate that Devils Tower was
more than an igneous rock sparking the interest of western geologic sci-
ence.50 During the 1980s and early 1990s, the staff at the Tower noticed
an increase in the number of what were presumed to be American Indian
prayer "offerings" that were left at or near the base of the Tower.51
These offerings commonly consisted of colorful ribbon and wrapped
bundles of sage (or other types of vegetation such as tobacco), and they
were commonly understood to be an indication of Indian religious activ-
ity at the Tower.52 Although a general sense existed that the Tower was
an area of cultural significance to some Indian groups, the NPS needed to
46 This information is derived from an administrative record. See NAT'L PARK SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL CLIMBING MGmT. PLAN FINDING No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT,
RoCKY MouNrAIN REGION, DENVER (1995) (on file at park headquarters) [hereinafter FnAL
CLIMBING MGMT. PLAN].
47 See FINAL CLIMBING MGMT. PLAN, supra note 46, at xii.
48 Directive from U.S. Dep't of the Interior, National Park Service, to All Regional Di-
rectors (1991). The memorandum stated that "each park area with climbing activities should
develop a climbing management plan based on Chapter 8.3 of the NPS Management Policies."
Id.
49 Although climbing was a recreational activity that had seen dramatic increases in re-
cent years and had not been considered in management plans prior to this time, parks were
directed to apply standard planning techniques to address this issue. See FINAL CLIsBING
MGmT. PLAN, supra note 46.
50 A Presidential Proclamation established the Tower under the authority of the newly
passed Antiquities Act. See Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906); Antiquities Act of
1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431-433 (1906). The Proclamation focuses on preserving the Tower for its
value to geologic science. No mention is made of preserving the Tower for cultural reasons.
51 See Hanson & Chirinos, supra note 1.
52 See id.
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gain a greater understanding of this significance, and therefore commis-
sioned the Hanson and Chirinos study cited throughout this article.53
Additional factors served to make the planning process more com-
plex than most. First, Devils Tower was the first national monument in
the United States, and as such, it is the focus of much local pride.54 Sec-
ond, the Tower itself is considered by most climbers to be a world class
technical climbing opportunity, and the increase in climbers there over
the years has come to include international as well as domestic rock
climbers.5 5 The increase in visitorship and climbing has spawned tourist
businesses that rely on climbers and climbing.56 These businesses had a
stake in any plan that addressed climbing activities. Third, not long
before the climbing planning began at Devils Tower, regional Indian
groups had been involved in a lengthy planning process over the
Medicine Wheel, another site on national forest lands in northern Wyo-
ming that is considered sacred by Indian tribes.57 Indian intertribal orga-
nizations were formed with the intent of becoming more involved in the
Forest Service planning process that addressed the management of the
Medicine Wheel.58 After fighting to protect the Medicine Wheel and
winning significant concessions for protection of this site, these organi-
zations turned their attention to Devils Tower and the climbing manage-
ment plan.5 9
2. Designing the Planning Process.
With these factors in mind, the NPS understood that the Devils
Tower presented a rather unique case of potential conflict between
climbers and American Indians. As a premier rock climbing site, the
Tower was a destination point for climbers from all over the world. As a
site considered sacred by American Indian groups, the Tower was
53 See id
54 Personal communications between David Ruppert, NPS Planners, and the Devils
Tower superintendent and staff, 1992, in preparation for the climbing management plan
process.
55 See id.; see also Jack Trope, Existing Federal Law and the Protection of Sacred Sites:
Possibilities and Limitations, 19(4) CurL uRA SuRvrv~A QuomiA..Y 30 (1996).
56 See iL
57 See id.
58 Two groups were formed to protect sacred Indian sites. The first of these was the
Medicine Wheel Alliance, which was spearheaded by a highly respected Northern Cheyenne
elder, the late Bill Tall Bull. See Trope, supra note 55. Another organization with a similar
purpose was formed later and named the Medicine Wheel Coalition. See id. The Coalition
differed from the Alliance in that its members were sanctioned by the tribal councils of each
tribe that joined the group. See id This factor was of some importance when it came time for
the NPS to form the planning work group that would help design the climbing management
plan for Devils Tower.
59 See Duane Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-
Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REv. 145, 164 (1996).
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viewed as being desecrated by climbing activities. The planning process
would have to confront these starkly different cultural views in a manner
that would both acknowledge the potential conflict and try to develop
solutions. To this end, the NPS decided on a planning process that maxi-
mized input from the various potential conflicting factions.60
The planning process itself was a departure from the usual proce-
dures used by many NPS planners. The process was designed, as all
planning processes are designed in a federal agency, around the need to
comply with laws and regulations related to assessments of environmen-
tal impacts and appropriate public input in reaching a management deci-
sion. Normally, most planning is largely done internally within the
agency and public meetings are held to elicit public reaction to a range of
proposed alternative actions. The Devils Tower plan followed this
course, but also added a work group to this process composed of agency
and non-agency members.61 While the Tower superintendent held au-
thority over final decisions, this work group became a core element in
the planning process.
The work group was composed of representatives of those groups
that had, up to that point, expressed the greatest interest in the planning
process, or who were perceived by the agency to be major "stake hold-
ers," or interested parties, in the outcome of the climbing management
plan. The following groups were identified as the four major stake hold-
ers: 1) climbing community, represented by both local and national
climbing organizations; 2) local and national environmental organiza-
tions; 3) the local government, represented by the county commissioner's
office; and 4) those American Indian communities that had been identi-
fied through recent in-house studies62 as having a strong affiliation with
the Tower.63
60 The NPS's actions were in keeping with the most widely accepted principles of effec-
tive contemporary environmental conflict management practice. See generally Barbara Gray,
Framing and Re-Framing of Intractable Environmental Disputes, 6 Ras. ON NEGOTIATION IN
ORGANIZATIONS 163 (1997).
61 This added dimension to the process was verbally approved by the superintendent and
the Assistant Regional Director of the Rocky Mountain Regional Office in Denver, not long
before the planning process began.
62 See Hanson and Chirinos, supra note 1; Jeffrey R. Hanson & David Moore, Ritual and
Recreational Perception and Use at Devils Tower National Monument, Wyoming: An Applied
Ethnographic Study, 1993 (unpublished manuscript on file at the Devils Tower National Mon-
ument headquarters).
63 The Access Fund, a national organization representing the interests of rock climbers,
was invited to sit at the work group table, as were the local chapter of the Sierra Club, and the
local county commissioner. This determination was made at initial meetings between the park
superintendent and regional park service staff. One of the authors of this article, David Rup-
pert, was in attendance at these initial meetings. All three of these groups agreed to become
members of the work group for the climbing management plan. Agency officials were con-
cerned that such a work group would violate the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended, which was designed to prevent special interest groups from having too great an
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The superintendent invited two representatives from each of these
interest groups to serve on the planning work group. Since at least six
tribes were known at that time to have a cultural and historic affiliation
with the Devils Tower, the superintendent decided to invite two tribal
representatives from the Medicine Wheel Coalition.6a The Coalition's
representatives were sanctioned by the tribal governments of those tribes
who were its members. By inviting this organization to participate, the
NPS sought to preserve a government-to-government relationship with
the larger group of tribes having an interest in climbing issues at the
Tower.65
The work group held five meetings over a period of approximately
one year. The first of these meetings drew the proverbial lines in the
sand. Representatives of the climbing group felt that few or no restric-
tions should be placed on climbers at the Tower, and that the plan should
recognize the monument as an important site for climbers from around
the world.66 Members representating tribal interests called for an out-
right ban on all climbing at the Tower and referred to climbing as a
"desecration" of a sacred place. 67 The Sierra Club representative fo-
cused on the impact that climbing has had on the natural resources of the
Tower, and the local government representative expressed concern over
the potential adverse impact any restriction on climbing would have on
local businesses.68
The differences in points of view between the work group members
representing American Indian interests and those representing the climb-
influence in governmental management decisions. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1971). Consequently, the work group was designed in a way that
ensured that members were reacting to agency proposals and not constructing alternative ac-
tions themselves. However, throughout the lengthy meetings during the planning process, the
work group provided many important ideas that were seriously taken into consideration when
the agency constructed the draft and final plan.
64 See supra note 63.
65 The Tower superintendent at that time, Debbie Bird, traveled to tribal offices of other
tribes and organizations who were not themselves invited to become members of this work
group, although they were known to have a real interest in the issues. She sought concurrence
from affiliated tribes with her decision to have the Coalition represent tribal interests on the
planning work group. Deb Liggett, who succeeded Ms. Bird as Superintendent, shepherded
the climbing plan to its final form and eventually implemented it in the park. These meetings
and visits with tribes is part of the administrative record held at the park. The first year of the
implementation of the voluntary climbing closure in 1996 resulted in an 85% compliance rate.
This information is part of the administrative record on compliance with the plan, which is part
of the administrative record on file at the park headquarters. Simply, this means that 85% of
those climbers that would normally have climbed the Tower in June chose voluntarily not to
do so after being informed of the work group's call for a voluntary closure.
66 This information is part of the administrative record of work group meeting notes on
file at park headquarters.
67 See supra note 66.
68 See UL
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ers were greatest at the outset of the planning meetings. Tribal represent-
atives repeatedly equated climbing the Tower to climbing St. Peter's
Cathedral in Rome. 69 Such an act, they claimed, would certainly be
viewed as a desecration of a sacred place by Catholics around the world.
The climbers' representatives understood that climbing may need to be
managed, but they strongly resisted any suggestion that climbing be
banned to accommodate a group's religious beliefs, since such a ban
would set a dangerous precedent for the management of other climbing
areas.70
3. Work Group Meetings: Education, Cultural Brokering, and
Solutions Reflecting Cultural Values.
Three factors dominated the evolving nature of the work group and
constituted the driving forces that brought about a compromise of irrec-
oncilable differences. 71 The first of these factors was the recognition that
there was a wide and persistent cultural gap between the conflicting par-
ties. Each group came to the table not as representatives from the same
larger society, but as representatives of groups with different languages,
histories, values, beliefs and ways of life. When a member of each of
these groups viewed the Tower, they saw a vastly differing landscape-a
landscape that was home to core values shaped by different histories, and
consequently, different ways of perceiving the world and their respective
places in that world.
Thus, from a practical standpoint, there was a clear need to direct
the early work group sessions toward some kind of mutual cross-cultural
education. The tribal elders spent many hours during the early meetings
trying to explain to the non-Indian climbers how culturally important and
sacred a place like Devils Tower is to Indian peoples.72 The elders spoke
of religious ceremonies and tribal origin stories related to the Tower.73
They spoke allegorically and directly about the religious significance of
the Tower, and they spoke in some detail of tribal religions in an effort to
impart an understanding of their cultural perspectives to the other work
group members.74 Such information, it was explained, is closely guarded
and often not shared with outsiders, but it was important that the climb-
ers understand the nature and character of the Tower's religious
importance.
69 See Ud
70 See id
71 See U
72 See id.
73 See id
74 See iL
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From the other side, an effort was made to explain to tribal members
the importance of climbing, and the climbing experience, to those who
engaged in this activity.75 They explained that for some the act of climb-
ing was a kind of religious experience, and therefore climbing should be
afforded any accommodations provided to American Indian religious
practitioners. Since the tribal elders often voiced concern over the
number of bolts and pitons used in climbing Devils Tower, the climbers
brought in new technical climbing equipment and explained that bolting
was only used in those instances when it was considered the only safe
way to climb a route.76
The second factor involved the emergence of a cross-cultural "bro-
ker" that helped shepherd the group through issues that both sides found
difficult to address. 77 Early in the planning process, it became evident
that there was a need to provide an "interpretation," or "translation," of
the significance of the Tower to Indian people through the voices of the
Native American elders who were members of the work group.78 One
individual, Elaine Quiver from Pine Ridge, who was originally not a
member of the work group, offered explanations or interpretations of sto-
ries that the elders were sharing with the work group.79 Quiver's contri-
butions helped to bridge the gap of understanding for all the group
members, and eventually she was invited to become a member of the
group.
Essentially, Quiver served as an effective cultural broker between
the American Indians and the climbers who were members of the work
group. Her ability to understand the at times allegorical communication
methods used by tribal elders was coupled with an ability to explain or
retell these stories in a manner understandable to all the non-Indian
members of the group.
The third factor was the character of the compromise itself. All
compromise can be viewed as an assessment of mutual loss and gain.
One party is often willing to alter an original position if they perceive
that their adversary is also willing to adjust their original demands. Part
of this process is educational-each party coming to at least a partial
understanding of what the original positions are and what they mean.
75 See id.
76 American Indian work group members felt strongly that it was wrong to drill for bolts
or in any other way use intrusive equipment on the Tower, since it viewed such activity as
damaging to a sacred site. See id. The climbers in the work group demonstrated newer equip-
ment, such as "friends"-a ridged, tapered piece of metal that is secured by wedging it within
rock cracks without removing rock. Equipment like this is normally removed after each use.
See id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
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These processes of education and interpretation are often hard enough
within a monocultural context. However, the situation becomes more
complex when the parties are separated not only by negotiating positions,
but also by different cultural heritage. The cultural differences affect, and
often hamper, the communication and learning process, and they cer-
tainly affect the process of interpretion and understanding, since the
meaning attached to each party's position is normally most easily under-
stood within the context of each group's own cultural orientation.
The compromise planning solution at Devils Tower was reached not
only by the recognition that each party was willing to change their origi-
nal positions, but that the new agreed upon position had important, and
salient cultural meanings for each group. After all parties agreed to
make some effort to limit climbing at the Tower out of respect for Amer-
ican Indian religious values, the discussion turned to a choice between a
mandatory or voluntary annual closure to climbing during the month of
June each year.80 The climbers strongly opposed any mandatory closure
out of a fear that a mandatory closure would set a precedent for the man-
agement of other climbing areas.81 Indian work group members felt that
they had already compromised a great deal by limiting the closure to
only one month of the summer, albeit the busiest climbing month of the
year at the Tower.82 At this stage in the process, the American Indian
representatives felt that they needed to go back home and discuss this
issue with their own tribal members and seek advice on how to
proceed.83
The mandatory versus voluntary closure debate ended when the
American Indian work group members, through Elaine Quiver, an-
nounced that after consulting with other tribal members it was decided
that a voluntary closure was not only an acceptable solution, but it was
the preferred solution.84 Quiver explained that while many still argued
for a mandatory closure to climbing, others felt that respect for Indian
traditions and religious beliefs was a more important issue.85 A
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 The time taken to hold a number of meetings over a relatively long period of time
anticipated the need for work group members to return to their own constituents to discuss
what they had heard and to get advice on how to proceed. See id. Returning home to discuss
issues raised at the work group meetings was especially important for the American Indian
work group members. Throughout the planning process, they often expressed the need to
return home to discuss the issues with tribal leaders and elders. See id. Of course, all tribes are
different, but as a general rule, consultation with American Indian groups often involves the
need for those representing tribes to "take the issues home" to discuss with other appropriate
tribal members. See id. A consultation process which does not allow time for this may often
be viewed as incomplete.
84 See id.
85 See id.
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mandatory closure may keep people from climbing, but this forced re-
striction would not allow people to express their respect for Indian cul-
tural values. A voluntary closure meant that climbers would have the
opportunity to choose not to climb, and this personal decision would ex-
press their respect for Indian people and their traditions. As it was ex-
pressed at one planning meeting by a tribal member, "if someone
chooses not to climb, the respect comes from their heart."8 6
The voluntary closure was acceptable from the climbing groups'
perspective in that it would not place formidable mandatory legal con-
trols on climbing the Tower, and as mentioned above, would not set
management precedent for other rock climbing areas.87 The climbing
representatives agreed that should the plan be approved as a temporary
voluntary closure, their organizations would help educate the climbing
public about the closure through public announcements and articles in
national climbing magazines. 8
4. Administrative Outcomes and Legal Challenges.
The end result of this remarkable effort was the NPS's issuance in
February, 1995, of a Final Climbing Management Plan ("FCMP") for
Devils Tower.89 The Plan called for a prohibition on the use of climbing
hardware that would damage and deface rockfaces on the Tower, and it
implemented the voluntary June closure to climbing that had been agreed
upon in the negotiations described above.90 The latter action included a
suspension by the NPS of the issuance of commercial climbing licenses
for the month of June.91
Three months later, President Clinton issued an Executive Order ap-
plicable to all federal land management agencies with jurisdiction over
sacred sites, instructing them to assure access to and ceremonial use of
such sites by indigenous peoples, and to ensure the physical integrity of
such sites. 92 The language of the Executive Order closely paralleled, in
both intent and instruction, the very actions just taken by the NPS regard-
ing the Devils Tower FCMP.
86 ld.
87 The final plan did call for mandatory closure of selected climbing routes on the Tower
grounds during the nesting season of predatory birds. See supra notes 46 and 66. This closure
for natural resource reasons led one Indian work group member to comment that the NPS gave
more weight to the protection of birds than it did to the protection of Indian heritage. See id.
88 See supra note 66.
89 See FJNAL CLMBING MANAGEmENT PLAN, supra note 46. For a recounting of admin-
istrative action on this matter and the contents of the FCMP, see Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-063-D (D.Wyo. June 8, 1996), at 1-3 (order granting in part and
denying in part plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction).
90 See supra note 46.
91 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, at 2.
92 See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771-26,772 (1996).
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Nonetheless, a mere two weeks subsequent to publication of the
President's Order, U.S. District Court Judge William Downes, from the
District of Wyoming, granted a preliminary injunction against implemen-
tation of the FCMP.93 Judge Downes' order cited the likelihood that the
plaintiff commercial climbing guides would prevail at trial on the argu-
ment that the June moratorium on issuance of commercial climbing per-
mits represented an impermissible establishment of Indian religion by the
NPS.94 Therefore, the Tower superintendent did not impose the morato-
rium, and instead issued a subsequent FCMP Reconsideration clarifying
the voluntary nature of the June suspension of climbing activities. 95
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CLIMBING
MANAGEMENT CONFLICT AT DEVILS TOWER
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
From the perspective of the NPS and the tribes participating in the
FCMP consultation process, the district court's action was a highly un-
settling decision in what some thought to be a fairly settled area of law-
the discretion of federal agencies to accommodate tribal religious prac-
tices in the management of public lands.
At the constitutional level, two general realms of doctrine are impli-
cated: the trust relationship between the U.S. Government and American
Indian tribes, and the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The congressional enactments and court decisions dis-
cussed below are best understood as continuing efforts to fashion a work-
able relationship between the two, and as legal developments arising
from the Devils Tower dispute have demonstrated, this continues to be
very much a work in progress.
1. The Trust Relationship.
As indicated in the introduction to this article, federal judicial treat-
ment of issues regarding the spiritual practices of indigenous peoples has
varied over the years, but it may generally be understood as following
one of two paths of analysis. They emanate from different articles and
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and they usually tend to reach dif-
ferent destinations.
The first is the trust responsibility of the United States to its indige-
nous "nations within," 96 incurred by a combination of original constitu-
93 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, No. 96-CV-063-D (D. Wyo. June 8, 1996).
94 See id. at 14.
95 See Nat'l Park Service, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Devils Tower National Monument,
Reconsideration of Certain Climbing Limitations in the Final Climbing Mgmt. Plan (1992) (on
file at park headquarters).
96 Chambers, infra note 111.
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tional language, early Supreme Court caselaw, and military subjugation
of American Indian tribes by the U.S. Army. The U.S. had been making
treaties with Indian tribes for nearly a decade prior to the writing of the
Constitution.97 These treaties included promises that tribal lands would
only be acquired through purchase or cession, and not by conquest.98
Thus, the Article II powers granted to the President to make treaties,
subject to Senate ratification, 99 were assumed to extend to future land
acquisition agreements with Indian tribes as well as European nations,
meaning that the Supremacy Clause would apply to enforcement of such
treaties as against state law whenever the two were found to conflict. 100
And since Article I gave Congress the power to regulate commerce with
"foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes,"''
it was a reasonable enough assumption at the time that the tribes were
more like foreign nations than like states, since states are not in a treaty-
making relationship with the federal government. 10 2
However, nearly four decades passed from the time these Articles
were drafted until the U.S. Supreme Court first crafted a definitive decla-
ration of the legal status of American Indian tribes within the constitu-
tional framework. In Justice John Marshall's opinion in Johnson v.
Mcintosh,10 3 the otherwise eminent jurist came closer than perhaps at
any other time in his thirty years of administering justice to simply de-
claring that might makes right. The court found that "discovery" of
lands in North America by the U.S. Government created title to all such
lands in the government; that "the title by conquest is acquired and main-
tained by force;"' 4 that the "conqueror prescribes its limits;"' 0 5 and that
Indian tribes hold not the rights of absolute ownership reserved to sover-
eign governments, but only a "right of occupancy"' 0 6 that the U.S. could
extinguish at will.10 7 Eight years later in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,10 8
Marshall further clarified the status of the tribes by holding that they
were "domestic dependent nations,"' 0 9 with the relationship between the
97 See LLOYD BURTON, AUMRicAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE Lmm-s OF LAW 12
(1991).
98 See iL
99 See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
100 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
101 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
102 See BRTON, supra note 97.
103 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823).
104 Id. at 589.
105 Id.
106 id. at 591.
107 See id. at 587.
108 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831).
109 Id. at 17.
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tribes and the federal government resembling that of a "ward to his
guardian."l"0
This was a breathtaking usurpation of the rights of self-governance
over their peoples and resources that the tribes had enjoyed from time
immemorial until their conquest in the field by U.S. armed forces, and in
court by the reasoning of John Marshall. It was a seizure that would
come at a price. Having created the analogy to the common law ward-
guardian relationship, the federal government would from that time for-
ward be bound in theory, and more often than not in practice, by that
same jurisprudential tradition-to hold in trust for the benefit of the
tribes the powers of governance and of resource management that, in the
Cherokee Nation decision, the Supreme Court had abrogated.
While it is far beyond the scope of this article to review the trust
relationship in its entirety, suffice it to say that it survives as the most
durable and often-referenced touchstone in federal government dealings
with American Indian tribes."' To be sure, Congress has been recog-
nized by the courts as having broad latitude to determine through the
policy process what is in the tribes' "best interest.""12 During the nine-
teenth century, it was first to remove them west of the Mississippi to
Indian Country, then to confine them to reservations, and ultimately to
force their assimilation into the dominant culture by allotting reservation
lands to individual tribal members and selling off the rest to non-Indian
settlers, and (indirectly) land developers. 113 The allotment/assimilation
period also included a concerted federal effort to obliterate tribal culture
altogether. The government sent Indian children to English-only board-
ing schools many miles from home and family, and prohibited, under
penalty of criminal sanction, many of the most significant tribal religious
ceremonies.114
110 Id.
111 Although slightly dated, one of the more thoughtful in-depth overviews of the trust
relationship is Reid Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Trust Responsibility, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1218 (1975). As Chambers demonstrates, a reading of Marshall's decisions in historical
context does allow for a more charitable interpretation than their language on its own might
suggest. During the time these cases were being decided, Euro-Americans were illegally en-
tering and settling on tribal lands throughout the western frontier, and the federal government
was doing little to stop it, in part because it had also failed to keep its promise to states to eject
indigenous peoples from within state borders. See iL Thus, the "Marshall trilogy" of deci-
sions-M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester v. Georgia-achieved the dual objectives
of subordinating tribal rights to federal authority on the one hand, while shielding tribes from
land predation by hostile state governments and settlers on the other. For additional discussion
of these decisions in historical context, see CHARLEs WuKiNsoN, AmRicAN INDIANs, Tam,
Dam LAW (1987).
112 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
113 See S. LYMAN TYLER, 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN PoLicY (1973).
114 See Anastasia Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 Amz. L. REv. 1291 (1996).
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When it became apparent that these nineteenth century efforts at
forced assimilation were not succeeding, Congress eventually had a
change of heart, and it passed legislation in 1934 granting the tribes
greater conditional powers of self-governance. 115 Except for another
brief attempt by Congress in the 1950s to terminate tribal governments
and sell off their natural resources, the policy trend throughout most of
the twentieth century has been toward greater tribal self-determination
and gradual restoration of sovereignty. 116 The civil rights era in Ameri-
can society brought with it several federal legislative efforts on behalf of
indigenous peoples' rights. 117
More recently, in the realm of indigenous spiritual practices and
related cultural properties, Congress has embarked upon what might be
called the "era of atonement." In frank recognition of past abuses of the
trust responsibility-including actions to erase tribal culture (such as
religious practices) from the national memory-Congress has enacted a
series of measures designed to atone for what, by today's standards, ap-
pear to be nineteenth century acts of attempted cultural extermination.
This particular policy trend began with the 1978 American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act ("AIRFA"), 11 to be followed by the 1990 Native
American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA")," 9 the
1992 amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act
("NHPA"), 120 the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), 21 and the proposed AIRFA Amendments of 1994.122
2. The Trust Relationship Meets the First Amendment.
However, Congress did not create these atonement era policies in a
jurisprudential vacuum. The legislative histories of these statutes reveals
a congressional awareness that while one line of federal judicial analysis
has treated tribal religion-based claims primarily as a matter of intergov-
ernmental relations (necessitating federal and state governmental accom-
modation of tribal religious interests within the ambit of the trust
relationship), an alternative approach has been to treat these disputes as
predominantly susceptible to principles derived in interpretation of the
religion clauses (Free Exercise and Establishment) of the First Amend-
115 See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).
116 See TYLER, supra note 113, at 151-88.
117 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301; Indian Self-Determination and
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a-450n.
118 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
119 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013 (1996).
120 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1992).
121 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1993).
122 42 U.S.C. § 1996-1996a (1994).
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ment. 123 The former approach has usually, although by no means al-
ways, proved more advantageous to tribal interests than the latter, as the
following discussion of relevant caselaw indicates.
In reviewing these cases, certain distinguishing features of fact and
law are worth keeping in mind. First is the relationship between the trust
responsibility and the religion clauses, in terms of which set of doctrines
had the greatest impact on case outcomes. Second is the question of
whether it was the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause that
was chiefly implicated. Third is the question of whether the religious
practice in question was tied to the management of a specific sacred site,
or dealt instead with a ritual unattached to a land use management
decision.
Preceding AIRFA, the first of the atonement era statutes, by four
years was a Supreme Court decision that encouraged the development of
these laws by holding that the trust relationship provided a congressional
basis for preferential treatment of tribal governments in ways not usually
allowable under the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 124 In Morton v. Mancari,125 the Court upheld a tribally-
imposed employment preference for Indians, finding that such prefer-
ences can be viewed with less exacting scrutiny than preferences for
other racial or ethnic groups because of the historical and political rela-
tionship between tribes and the federal government (i.e., the trust rela-
tionship).126 The Court determined that "as long as special treatment can
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to-
ward Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."'127 The
Court upheld the hiring preference because it was found to be rationally
related to the legitimate congressional objective of fostering greater tribal
self-determination; it was not racial in nature because it favored indige-
nous persons as members of a tribe subject to the trust relationship, and
not simply as individuals in a discrete ethnic group. 128
Thus, when AIRFA was being debated in Congress, the reasoning in
Morton created some hope on the part of tribal advocates that the histori-
cal antipathy of federal policy makers toward tribal religion might now
be truly remedied. But there was fear on the part of others that AIRFA
might create some sort of preferential "religious servitude" on public
lands outside reservation boundaries that neighboring tribes might hold
123 See Winslow, supra note 114.
124 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
125 Id.
126 See id. at 550.
127 Id at 555.
128 See id. at 555.
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sacred. 129 Morris Udall, a Congressman from southern Arizona and the
bill's sponsor, sought to allay such fears during debate on the measure by
portraying it only as a "sense of Congress" to ensure that "the basic right
of Indian people to exercise their traditional religious practices is not
infringed without a clear decision" of the federal government to do so;
that the act would "not change any existing State or Federal law;" and
that therefore, in terms of enforceability, the law "has no teeth in it.' 13o
The federal courts would soon prove Congressman Udall's words to
be all too true. AIRFA provided no support for the Cherokees' unsuc-
cessful effort in 1980 to halt construction of the Tellico Dam because it
would flood sacred homelands,' 31 for failed Navajo attempts that same
year to prevent the filling of Lake Powell from flooding the base area of
Rainbow Bridge (a sacred site) and thereby encouraging a proliferation
of tourists, 132 or for the vain efforts of the Navajo and Hopi tribes two
years later to enjoin expansion of a ski resort near the San Francisco
Peaks in northern Arizona's Coconino National Forest.' 33
In these cases, the tribes sought to influence governmental land
management decisionmaking in recognition of their religious affinity
with the site in question, based not only on the "sense of Congress" ex-
pressed in AIRFA, but on arguments that their First Amendment rights to
free exercise of their environmentally rooted religions were being denied
as well. 34 In each of these cases, the free exercise argument failed. In
most free exercise cases not involving public lands, non-Indian plaintiffs
need only show that a governmental action places a substantial burden on
the free exercise of their religion in order for the government to be re-
quired to demonstrate a compelling interest in limiting religious prac-
tices; 135 but in these sacred site cases the tribes had to show more. The
courts imposed the additional requirement that preservation of, and ac-
cess to, the site in question was central and indispensable to the practice
of tribal religion; 136 and in none of these cases could the tribes meet that
requirement to the respective courts' satisfaction. Unable to make this
showing, the federal government, in its defense, had only to demonstrate
that a legitimate (non-Indian) public interest was being served by the
129 See DAVID GETCHES, CHARLEs WrIKNsoN & ROBERT WILLIAMS JR., FEDERAL INDIMN
LAW 751 (3Vd ed. 1993).
130 124 CONG. REc. 21,444, 21,445 (1978).
131 See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
132 See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
133 See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
134 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135 See Winslow, supra note 114.
136 See id.
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management decision in question in order to shield its actions from a
tribal free exercise challenge. 137
Perhaps the most graphic example of the relative powers of the
tribes and the federal government agencies in this area is the Supreme
Court's 1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Associ-
ation.138 In this case, plaintiffs sought to enjoin USFS road construction
through a traditional indigenous cemetery on Forest Service land, which
was also the site of contemporary tribal religious observances. 139 The
plaintiff tribes established both centrality and indispensability, resulting
in a district court injunction against construction of the logging road that
was upheld on the government's appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 140 However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that road
construction did not burden Indian religious practices because it did not
coerce individuals to "act against their faith."141 The Court found that
the Forest Service could literally destroy tribal religion by building a
road, since the construction would not coerce Indian religious practition-
ers into actively violating their own beliefs. 142
While the Court in Lyng surely did not uphold an outcome support-
ive of tribal free exercise interests, it nevertheless clearly upheld the abil-
ity of federal agencies to factor tribal religious practices into land use
decision-making, if at their discretion they choose to do so. While spe-
cifically disclaiming the existence of a tribal "religious servitude" on
public lands, either by reason of AIRFA or interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Court specifically acknowl-
edged the ability of the Forest Service to incorporate tribal religious in-
terests into its management practices in holding that the "[g]ovemment's
rights to the use of its own land need not and should not discourage it
from accommodating religious practices."'143 Thus, it is left to the fed-
eral land management agency to determine what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation of tribal religious needs.
In 1990, the Court appeared similarly unsympathetic to an Indian
Free Exercise claim outside the realm of land use. In Oregon Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith,144 the Court upheld a state statute
criminalizing the use of peyote against a Free Exercise challenge by two
137 See id. at 1291-92.
138 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
139 See id.
140 See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985).
141 Here the court was distinguishing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a decision
in which it had voided enforcement of a state employment law requiring the plaintiff to work
on her Sabbath.
142 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-52.
143 Id. at 454.
144 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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American Indians fired from their jobs (and subsequently denied unem-
ployment compensation), because they had participated in sacramental
use of the substance at a ritual conducted by the Native American
Church. In upholding the Oregon statute, a five-member majority of the
Court determined that the state need only show that it had enacted a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability," the impact of which on
the free exercise of religion was "incidental."' 45 In the majority opinion,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that "leaving [religious] accommodation to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in."146 However, he found the po-
tential for such majoritarian discrimination greatly preferable to "court-
ing anarchy"' 147 by more searching judicial scrutiny of religious practice
restrictions, which in his view would result in a "system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social impor-
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."'148 He
therefore found the need for judicial restraint and deference to state law
sufficiently strong to defeat the Free Exercise claim. 149
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence, in which she dis-
agreed strongly with what she saw as the majority opinion's retreat from
judicial responsibility in this case.150 She argued that any law so com-
pletely prohibiting an important religious practice should require the
state to carry the heavier burden of proof of showing a compelling inter-
est that was being achieved by means least restrictive of religious lib-
erty. 15 1 She concurred only in finding the state law constitutional,
because (in her view) it would survive the strict judicial scrutiny she
advocated. 152
The dissenters in Smith argued that strict scrutiny should apply and
that the Oregon law should not survive it. 153 This argument was based in
no small part on the judgment of Congress, as expressed in the legislative
history of AIRFA, that "certain substances, such as peyote, 'have reli-
gious significance, because they are sacred, they have power, they heal,
they are necessary to the exercise of the rites of religion, they are neces-
sary to the cultural integrity of the tribe, and therefore, religious
survival.' "154
145 Id. at 879.
146 Id. at 890.
147 Id. at 888.
148 Id. at 890.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 891, 903.
151 See id. at 891-907.
152 See id. at 905.
153 See id at 907.
154 Id. at 920-21 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at 2 (1978)).
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Although the trust responsibility received no direct mention in this
case (since it was federal judicial review of state law), the peyote use
issue arose again in federal appeals court just one year later, in a case in
which the trust relationship played a central role. It also implicated the
Establishment Clause, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, and resulted
in quite a different outcome for tribal interests in the protection of spiri-
tual practices and traditions. In Peyote Way Church of God v. Thorn-
burgh,155 the Fifth Circuit used the reasoning found in the majority
opinion in Smith to uphold state and federal exemptions from prohibi-
tions against the possession and use of peyote.' 56 Since membership in
the Native American Church was predicated on enrollment in a federally-
recognized American Indian tribe, the court found that the federal ex-
emption from criminal sanctions of NAC members did not represent an
impermissible establishment of religion by government since the exemp-
tion arose from the intergovernmental trust relationship; thus, the prefer-
ential classification was political rather than religious. 157 Exemplifying
one of the judicial perspectives described in the introduction to this arti-
cle, the court reasoned that "the federal government cannot at once fulfill
its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native Americans and apply
conventional separatist understandings of the Establishment Clause to
that relationship," because "[t]he unique guardian-ward relationship be-
tween the federal government and Native American tribes precludes the
degree of separation ordinarily required by the First Amendment."' 158
A year later the First Circuit applied similar reasoning to a non-
Indian challenge to a tribal exemption from the federal criminal prohibi-
tion against possession of eagle feathers, so the feathers could be used in
Native American religious rituals. 159 Acknowledging that the exemption
represented preferential treatment of practitioners of traditional religions
in federally-recognized tribes, the court reasoned that such treatment was
nonetheless constitutionally permissible because it "finds its source in
Congress' historical obligation to respect Native American sovereignty
and to protect Native American culture."'160
155 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
156 See id. at 1213.
157 See id. at 1215.
158 Id. at 1217.
159 See Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
160 Id. at 35. For a discussion of Rupert and Peyote Way, as exemplifying an appropriate
path of judicial analysis in support of agency discretion in the accommodation of tribal reli-
gion, see Craig Alexander, Protection of Indian Sacred Places and the Religious Accommoda-
tion Doctrine, Sovereignty Symposium X, June 9-11, 1997, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Office of Tribal
Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C., (on file with authors). Craig Alexander is an
attorney for the U.S. Department Justice, and this piece is a briefing paper that he wrote for the
park superintendent and staff.
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It was also in 1992 that Congress amended the NHPA to make more
explicit the need for consultation with affected tribes whenever manage-
ment plans for historic sites covered by the Act were being drawn up in a
way that might implicate the preservation and perpetuation of tribal cul-
ture. 161 In yet another congressional reaffirmation of the federal trust
responsibility as instrumental in the protection of religious freedom, the
103rd Congress passed the RFRA.Y62 This federal legislative action was
undertaken with the stated intent of reversing the burden of proof ruling
in the majority opinion in Oregon v. Smith-thereby restoring the com-
pelling interest standard to judicial review of government action burden-
ing the free exercise of religion, as Justice O'Connor's concurrence and
the dissenting opinion in Smith had advocated. 163
B. APPL cATIoN TO T=E DEVILS TOWER CASE
As demonstrated above, the trust responsibility perspective and the
First Amendment Free Exercise approach represent two very different
modes of constitutional discourse on the same subject. Choice of per-
spective, and the precedents that inform them, tend to pre-ordain out-
comes in instant cases. Thus, it might reasonably be expected that any
contemporary judicial pronouncements in this subject area would attempt
an accounting of both perspectives, as well as at least some effort to
workably articulate the two. To dwell only on one approach is to say
what the law is after having told only half the legal story.
However, that is precisely what happened when the Devils Tower
controversy was cast into constitutional terms in Wyoming's U.S. Dis-
trict Court. In Judge Downes' preliminary injunction against NPS's im-
plementation of the temporary commercial climbing moratorium,164
there is no mention whatsoever of the federal trust responsibility to the
affected tribes; it receives only oblique and implicit acknowledgment by
reference to AIRFA. 165 Judge Downes held the controlling language to
be the dicta in a 1980 Tenth Circuit decision regarding a Free Exercise
claim lodged by tribes against the federal government (instead of an Es-
tablishment challenge issued by non-Indians, as in the Devils Tower con-
troversy)-the case in which the Navajos sought unsuccessfully to
161 See 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1992).
162 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1993).
163 The Supreme Court has since ruled that the compelling interest test does not apply to
judicial review of local government land use regulation of church property. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996).
164 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-063-D (D.Wyo. June 8,
1996).
165 See id. at 8.
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permanently exclude all tourist access to the Rainbow Bridge National
Monument. 166
Judge Downes' hostility to and general disregard for the federal
trust responsibility perspective in this case became even more apparent at
trial. Plaintiff commercial climbing guides were represented by the
Mountain States Legal Foundation, which asked the court not only to
enjoin permanently the implementation of the voluntary summer solstice
climbing moratorium, but also to order the NPS to delete references to
tribal religion from the Devils Tower National Monument interpretive
program, since in the plaintiffs' view this represented impermissible gov-
ernment entanglement in the teaching of religion. 167
As plaintiffs argued the climbing moratorium issue at the hearing,
the judge made some remarkably candid and oddly revealing observa-
tions on the record. "As I've told you before," he said from the bench,
"you're in front of the right judge on this issue, I think.1'' 68 He then told a
poignant personal story of being humiliated as a fourth grade student in
public school when the teacher refused to allow him to participate in a
class Bible reading because the class was using a Protestant Bible and he
was Catholic. 169
This is very much the sort of public institutional behavior that the
Supreme Court would later find violative of the Establishment Clause in
Lee v. Weisman.170 It became evident as the trial wore on that the judge's
painful personal experience as a stigmatized 10-year old member of a
religious minority group-and the vindication of his feelings half a cen-
tury later in Weisman- provided much of the perspective through which
he viewed the Devils Tower controversy. During the government's pres-
entation, the judge encouraged the Justice Department attorney repre-
senting the NPS to agree that as a fourth grader he would have had a
cause of action under Weisman if such a precedent had existed at that
time.171
In their arguments, Justice Department attorneys and defendant-in-
tervenor's Indian Law Resource Center attorneys both emphasized the
federal government's trust responsbility to the tribes and the recent find-
166 See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
167 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D.Wyo. 1998)
(transcript of hearing on the merits, held April 18, 1997. Transcript was certified September.
2, 1997).
168 Id. at 28.
169 See id. at 28-29.
170 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding that the Establishment Clause was offended by recitation
of a Christian prayer at a high school graduation ceremony, since it compelled non-Christian
students to involuntarily engage in a sectarian ritual if they wished to participate in their own
graduation).
171 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (transcript of hearing on the
merits, at 44-45).
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ings of the First and Fifth Circuits (in Thornburgh and Rupert) that the
government enjoys very substantial latitude in fulfilling that responsibil-
ity in the accommodation of Native American religion.' 72 But in a 100-
page trial transcript, Judge Downe's only acknowledgement of the poten-
tial applicability of the trust relationship doctrine to the Devils Tower
case was a two-sentence dismissal of these precedents as inapplicable
because they had not been decided by the Tenth Circuit.1 73 He had no
comment on the government's observation that the Tenth Circuit had just
decided a case in which it had rejected an Establishment Clause attack on
an EPA decision to allow a tribe in New Mexico to adopt more stringent
water quality standards than the rest of the state (so that the water would
be suitable for ceremonial purposes). 174
At the close of the trial, the judge referred to governmental respon-
sibility, but in quite a different context. He wondered at what was, from
his perspective, the misapplication of such skilled legal talent to the de-
fense of the government's actions to accommodate tribal cultural preser-
vation.175 In his view, the real threat to tribal survival was the wave of
crime and alcoholism sweeping across the reservations within his juris-
diction, and which Congress had not seen fit to address by the funding of
programs to which he could divert the youthful Indian offenders who
regularly appeared before him. 176 He urged advocates to spend more
time on these issues, else "we may still have preserved Native American
religion into the next century, but I'm not at all certain that there'll be
many Indian children left to exercise it. '"177
Finally, the attorney general for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
rose to make apparent the connection between the two issues. Survival is
the common theme, he commented: "we appear here in federal court to
protect our traditions because we believe that our traditions are in fact the
root of the solution to all of our societal ills. ' 178
The first week of April of 1998, the trial court handed down its
decision on the merits in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt.179
As in the preliminary injunction hearing, the decision made no reference
at all to the trust responsibility doctrine. Instead, the court based its find-
ings entirely on a First Amendment analysis.'80 Nevertheless, most of
172 See id. at 75-82.
173 See id. at 78.
174 See id. at 61-69. The case is City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428-29
(10th Cir. 1996).
175 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (transcript of hearing on the
merits, at 95-97).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 97.
178 Id. at 100.
179 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448.
180 See id.
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the holdings in this decision were in favor of the NPS and the inter-
cultural consultation process by which the amended climbing manage-
ment plan was derived.181
First, the court held moot the plaintiff's original challenge to the
management plan (which had initially placed a moratorium on the issu-
ance of commercial climbing permits in June), since the NPS had made
the commercial moratorium voluntary subsequent to the court's prelimi-
nary injunction against a mandatory one. 182 Plaintiffs had argued that
even though the ban was voluntary in print, it was not in practice, since
under the amended plan the NPS reserved the authority to again impose a
mandatory ban if the voluntary one failed to keep most climbers off the
Tower during the month of June. 183 However, the court found the possi-
bility of a future attempted mandatory ban to be "remote and specula-
tive,"'184 although the judge did note that were such a ban to be imposed,
it might not pass constitutional muster for the same reasons given when
he granted the preliminary injunction in the first place. 185
Second, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaints that the NPS in-
terpretive program was indoctrinating children into the religious beliefs
of Native Americans, and that the signs asking visitors to voluntarily stay
on trails (referencing its sacred status) represented a coerced observance
of indigenous religions. 186 However, these dismissals were made for
lack of plaintiff standing to sustain their complaints, and without com-
ment on the substance of the issues. 187 For the interpretive program, a
substantial discussion would have probably involved a painstakingly de-
tailed and inevitably subjective parsing of interpretive program materials
and public address transcripts to determine whether the program was
merely educational, or had impermissibly crossed the line into indoctri-
nation and compelled observance of indigenous religious tenets.
As discussed earlier, one of the more noteworthy features of the trial
court's ruling was that it substantially upheld the tribal and NPS posi-
tions without any acknowledgment of the federal trust doctrine per se.
Instead, the court cast the NPS's actions as a permissible accommodation
of religious worship (alleviating a burden on the indigenous freedom to
practice), in much the same way that the Supreme Court had shielded the
Mormon Church from an Establishment Clause attack on its religion-
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1450.
183 See it
184 Id. at 1456.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 1453.
187 See id.
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based hiring practices a decade earlier. 188 Following the Amos decision,
Judge Downes ruled that "the purposes underlying the [voluntary June
climbing] ban are really to remove barriers to religious worship occa-
sioned by public ownership of the Tower. This is the nature of accom-
modation, not promotion, and consequently is a legitimate secular
purpose."'1 89 In other words, the degree of accommodation is no more or
less than that for any other religious denomination-the only difference
being that the tribes' place of worship happens to be on public lands.
Ironically, this accommodation is precisely the policy objective
Congressman Morris Udall was trying to achieve twenty years earlier in
his drafting and advocating passage of the AIRFA at the outset of the
atonement era.190 But AIRFA's constitutional basis lies in both the trust
responsibility doctrine and the First Amendment, and Judge Downes
seemed determined to make his findings without any reference to the
former. The significance of this choice is that applying an exclusively
Establishment Clause frame of reference operates by trying to demon-
strate similarities in law between tribal spiritualism and Anglo-American
religious denominations, while the trust responsibility approach instead
emphasizes the uniqueness of the federal government relationship to the
tribes as semi-sovereign peoples rather than religious practitioners. As
applied in the Devils Tower trial court decision, pure Establishment
Clause analysis seeks to accommodate pluralism by focusing on per-
ceived sameness, while trust responsibility doctrine seeks the same ob-
jective by focusing on difference.
The distinction between the two is more than strictly academic.
Confining the analysis solely to Establishment Clause discourse denies
both the NPS and the affected tribes the moral authority to seek any
accommodation beyond that allowed by the decision (such as the tempo-
rary mandatory commercial climbing ban the superintendent first tried to
impose at the Tower). Following this approach, the superintendent may
have potent discretionary authority to prohibit all commercial and recrea-
tional activity in order to protect the physical integrity of the monument
or the well-being of its wildlife, but not to assure the unimpeded replica-
tion of spiritual aspects of tribal culture.
First Amendment analysis provides a more crisply defined, familiar,
and fairly predictable unifying framework within which to debate and
188 See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
189 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1454. In April of 1999, the Tenth
Circuit denied plaintiffs standing to appeal this decision, agreeing with the district court that
any possible future harm plaintiffs might suffer from the voluntary climbing moratorium was
"remote and speculative." Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
7950, No. 98-8021 (10' Cir. April 26, 1999).
190 See 124 CONG. REc. 21,444, 21,445 (1978).
1999]
232 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:201
make decisions on these matters; but it does so by ignoring the fact that
the spiritual dimensions of tribal societies are inextricably woven into the
fabric of daily life in specific (publicly held) landscapes. It also ignores
the nineteenth century history of forcible removal of indigenous peoples
from these sacred landscapes, and of recent congressional efforts to fos-
ter some degree of re-connection between indigenous peoples and sites
they hold sacred. In contrast, the trust responsibility doctrine takes full
account of these realities, but it does so at the expense of requiring the
continuing education of the dominant culture (both non-indigenous pub-
lic land users and the federal judiciary) as to why particular deference
must be accorded peoples whose cultural survival depends on periodic
unimpeded access to sacred places.
I. PLURALIST PERSPECTIVES ON SACRED
SITE MANAGEMENT
In Anglo-American legal literature, "legal pluralism" has at least
three different meanings. The first, historic use of the term describes the
parallel existence of indigenous "law ways" in small non-industrial cul-
tures and the European-style colonial or national legal systems superim-
posed upon them. 191 Much of early twentieth century anthropology's
focus on non-literate indigenous culture groups and their forms of social
ordering relative to colonizing legalization is reflective of this original
meaning of the concept.
More recently, a distinction has been made between this earlier
"classic" legal pluralism and the "new" legal pluralism, which refers in-
stead to "relations between dominant and subordinate groups, such as
religious, ethnic, or cultural minorities, immigrant groups, and unofficial
forms of ordering located in social networks or institutions... [These]
plural normative orders are found in virtually all societies."'192 This con-
struction still includes a superordinate state-imposed legal system, within
which the "plural normative orders" continue to function with varying
degrees of success based in part on how well their substantive and proce-
dural norms are harmonized with those of the state. Thus, the concept is
as applicable to modem industrial and post-industrial societies as the
classic meaning of the term was and is to developing, post-colonial na-
tion-states.
Yet a third use of the term has now come into being that makes no
direct reference to culture or cultural sub-groups, but rather refers to di-
verse approaches to interpreting the same core texts of a given legal sys-
191 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'y REv. 869 (1988).
192 Id. at 872-873.
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tem.193 This "constitutional pluralism" may exist with or without
substantial cultural diversity in the society governed by that system. The
pluralist perspective arises from fundamentally different understandings
and resultant interpretations of the same constitutive doctrines by schol-
ars and jurists trained in the same legal tradition. 194
All three meanings of the term have some applicability in the study
of policies governing sacred site management on the public lands of the
U.S. Regarding "classic" legal pluralism, most of the roughly 500 indig-
enous nations, tribes, and bands of people subject to the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Government have been governing themselves as much as their
subordinate and uncertain legal status would permit for at least as long as
the U.S. has been in existence, and they continue to do so today.
The consultative process by which the NPS derived the Devils
Tower Climbing Management Plan is demonstrative of the second mean-
ing of the term. The consultations included not only tribal representa-
tives, but non-Indian local government officials, rural business interests,
modern outdoor recreational interests, and non-Indian historic preserva-
tionists. 195 Each group had its own value orientation and its own site
management objectives based on those values. The challenge the NPS
successfully met was to design procedures for the attainment of out-
comes in which each of these sub-cultural groups felt that their values
were sufficiently respected and their objectives sufficiently established
that they could consent to the resulting plan in its final form. 196
What did not happen at trial in the Devils Tower case was due con-
sideration of the diverse constitutional perspectives applicable to such
conflict situations. This is unfortunate, given the amount of national at-
tention that will inevitably be focused on this controversy. Moreover,
conflicts such as the one that arose at Devils Tower are hardly unique in
the public lands of the western United States. As of this writing, there
are several ongoing, substantially unresolved situations at sites such as
Rainbow Bridge (where the NPS now seeks voluntary compliance with a
request that there be no tourist incursions directly under the arch), Chaco
Canyon and Bandelier National Monuments in New Mexico, and Cave
Rock, which is near Lake Tahoe on the California-Nevada border.' 97
193 See Stephen Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1753
(1994).
194 See id.
195 See Consultation meeting notes, supra note 27.
196 This is precisely the approach encouraged by observers who see in federal statutes
such as the NHPA the potential for rich, community-building, inter-cultural education and
cultural co-habitation on which the potential for peaceable existence in a pluralistic society
depends. See Suagee, supra note 59.
197 See Chris Smith and Elizabeth Manning, The Sacred and the Profane Collide in the
West, 29(10) IGH CourirY NEws 1, May 26, 1997, at 8.
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Some recent similar controversies have been consensually resolved to the
satisfaction of all parties concerned, such as the Bighorn Medicine
Wheel management plan for a site on National Forest lands in northern
Wyoming,198 while others, like Devils Tower, have ended up being adju-
dicated in federal court. 199
What do these pluralist perspectives consist of, and how might they
inform judicial review of future deliberations over the derivation of man-
agement plans at such contested sites? In his survey of pluralist perspec-
tives on constitutional interpretation, Stephen Griffin 2°° found that
scholars have discerned several different frameworks that the Supreme
Court has applied over time in interpreting various provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, from Fallon's five-stage hierarchy of literal text, framers'
intent, theory, precedent, and moral/policy values,20' to Robert Post's
non-hierarchical array of the differing forms of authority referenced by
judicial interpreters (doctrinal, historical, and responsive), 202 to Philip
Bobbitt's similarly co-equal modes of constitutional interpretation (his-
torical, structural, prudential, and ethical).203
Within this diversity of analytic frameworks, there actually lie some
commonalities, including appeals to historical tradition, to logically de-
rived structural doctrines, and to the morally compelling needs of the
times and circumstances in which a constitutional dispute arises. Each of
these has some applicability to the subject at hand. For instance, Post
takes up modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence by way of demon-
strating his analytic framework.204 He notes that the Court did a pains-
takingly thorough job of articulating a clear, if controversial, doctrinal
approach in its 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.205 To avoid Estab-
lishment Clause problems, government action must have both a secular
purpose and a primarily secular effect, and it must not excessively entan-
gle the government in religious practices.20 6
198 See id.
199 For a description of one such case, concerning the unsuccessful attempts of local
Apache tribes to block University of Arizona-sponsored construction of a large telescope at a
site held sacred by the tribes on National Forest lands on the slopes of Mount Graham, see,
e.g., Robert Williams, Large Binoculars, Telescopes, Red Squirrel Piftatas, and Apache Sacred
Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REv.
1133 (1996).
200 See Griffin, supra note 193.
201 See Richard Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1987).
202 See Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTA-1TONS 13,
19 (1990).
203 See Pami BOBBrrr, CONSTrTIONAL INTERPRETATIoN 13-21 (1991).
204 See Post, supra note 202.
205 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
206 See Post, supra note 202.
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Yet, just over a decade later, the majority of the Court would find
no constitutional problem with a state legislature hiring a chaplain to
open its sessions with Christian prayer.207 In its reasoning, the majority
dealt with the self-evident conflict of its decision with at least the first
two elements of the Lemon test, essentially by ignoring this fairly well-
established doctrinal approach, basing its holding instead on "the fact
that the 'opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative bodies
with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this coun-
try."' 20 8 A year later the Court would again abandon the Lemon test in
favor of a history-based rationale for upholding a municipal govern-
ment's practice of displaying a Nativity scene on public property, owing
to the historical origins of an event recognized as a traditional holiday.2°9
Post also demonstrates how the Court can and does explicitly reject
both "settled" doctrines and historical tradition when those past-rooted
perspectives deeply offend the contemporary moral order.210 This en-
ables the Constitution to function in what Oliver Wendell Holmes would
term as its "organic" capacity: its ability to serve as a living, socially
responsive, and contextual restatement of founding principles. 211 In
Post's view, the most notable example of this moral/responsive approach
is the Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,212 in which
it rejected both the structural underpinnings of the "separate but equal"
doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson213 in 1896, and the half-century's
worth of subsequent federal caselaw it had spawned.
Contemporary commentators on judicial review of government
agency management decisions in sacred site controversies have mixed
views on what approach should be taken. One school of thought seems
to hold that the matter should begin and end with application of the trust
responsibility doctrine. 214 Though judicially originated by Justice Mar-
shall's common law analogy in Cherokee Nation215 170 years ago, the
doctrine enjoys renewed vitality in modem "atonement era" congres-
sional enactments 216 and Executive Orders2 17 (as well as site-based ad-
207 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
208 Post, supra note 202, at 17.
209 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
210 See Post, supra note 202, at 17.
211 See id. at 23.
212 346 U.S. 483 (1954).
213 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
214 See, e.g., Raymond Cross and Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Crossroads:
The NPS and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21st Century, 18
PuB. LAND & RsoucFas L. REv. 5 (1997).
215 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831).
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978); 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013 (1996); 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)
(1992); 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1993).
217 See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,772 (1996).
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ministrative actions such as the Devils Tower Climbing Management
Plan), and in contemporary appellate decisions such as Rupert 18 and Pe-
yote Way.219 From this perspective, traditional religion clause doctrines
are largely irrelevant, and should play no controlling role.
A slightly more centrist position speaks instead of a range of per-
missible behavior between the First Amendment's twin prohibitions
against government either establishing religion or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof -a "window" of continuing judicial adjustment within
which federal government agencies may accommodate indigenous spiri-
tual practices for the predominantly secular purpose of aiding in tribal
cultural preservation (in keeping with the trust responsibility), while still
acknowledging that in extreme cases the Establishment Clause concerns
of non-Indians might be legitimately implicated.220
However, an opposing perspective holds that serious dangers lie in
relying too heavily on the trust responsibility doctrine.22' According to
this alternative view,222 while this approach might appear an appealing
instrument for the assertion of tribal interests in the form of the atone-
ment era statutes, President Clinton's 1996 Executive Order on sacred
site management,223 and decisions such as Mancari,224 Rupert,225 and
Peyote Way,2 26 the doctrine can be equally as destructive of tribal inter-
ests in the hands of federal legislators, administrators, and judges who
determine that legal pluralism has gone too far and more national uni-
formity is needed. It was only 100 years ago, for instance, that Congress
and the. executive branch forcibly removed Indian children from their
homes for education at remote government boarding schools and
criminalized most iribal religious practices 227 -all based on the rationale
that it was in the best interests of the United States' indigenous peoples
that their cultures be obliterated and that they be fully assimilated into
mainstream American society. 228 The courts rarely intervened during the
assimilation era, on the theory that shaping the contours of the trust re-
218 957 F.2d 32 (1992).
219 922 F.2d 1210 (1991).
220 See Alexander, supra note 160.
221 See Winslow, supra note 114 (a thorough argument in favor of this perspective).
222 See id.
223 See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,772 (1996).
224 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
225 957 F.2d 32.
226 922 F.2d 1210.
227 See Allison Dusias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of the 19' Century
Christinization Policy in the 20th Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
RPv. 773, 783-805 (1997).
228 See id.
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sponsibility doctrine is mostly a matter of political judgment, and thus
should be left to the political branches. 229
Furthermore, this argument runs, the dangers of recognizing such
plenary power over the fate of American Indian tribes to reside solely in
the federal government did not entirely pass away with the twentieth cen-
tury demise of the assimilation doctrine. Congress engineered a brief,
but radical, reversal of federal Indian policy as recently as a half-century
ago-the last time, prior to the present day, that states' rights-oriented
conservatives controlled both houses of Congress.230 Some remarkably
similar policy initiatives have been advocated by conservative western
politicians in the similarly configured 104th and 105th Congresses of the
1990s. An example would be Washington's Senator Gorton.231 More-
over, the recent sovereignty gains of indigenous tribes under the trust
responsibility doctrine have sometimes been at the expense of a severe
loss of legal status by indigenous persons. The Supreme Court has de-
nied state court access to Native Americans for the conduct of adoption
proceedings, justifying such race-based disparate treatment of individuals
on the theory that it benefited the class of which they were a part.232 The
same reasoning has been applied to rationalize the denial of equal protec-
tion to Native American women at family law,23 3 and to bar Indian crim-
inal defendants from access to the state judicial system, where but for
their race they would have been tried under rules much less likely to
result in the first degree murder convictions they suffered in federal
court.
2 34
From this position, relying too heavily on the trust responsibility
doctrine to shield federal agency sacred site management decision-mak-
ing from Establishment Clause attacks will work only as long as the
courts are willing to rely exclusively on the "morally compelling
need 235 category of pluralist approaches; and will work only as long as
Congress perceives a need to preserve and protect tribal culture rather
than an equally compelling need to annihilate it. The exclusive emphasis
on tribal sovereignty and the trust responsibility doctrine also can, and
occasionally does, severely disadvantage the status of individual Native
Americans, who would otherwise be entitled to all the rights and privi-
leges of other American citizens.
229 See id.
230 See BURTON, supra note 97, at 27-28.
231 See Timothy Egan, Senate Measures Would Deal Blow to Indian Rights, N.Y. TuAis,
August 27, 1997, at A20.
232 See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
233 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
234 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
235 Post, supra note 202.
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In Anastasia Winslow's view, a safer approach is to rely on equal
protection arguments to safeguard the practices of indigenous religious
observants rather than relying only on the good will of the government to
accede to the wishes of the tribal government or other political entity of
which the practitioners are members.236 This grounds arguments for sa-
cred site protection in other realms in the pluralist array, such as histori-
cal tradition (as applied in Marsh v. Chambers237 and Lynch v.
Donnelly2 38); and it has the added virtue of protecting the free exercise
rights of individual Native Americans, or of assemblages of religious
elders or dissidents within a tribe whose views may be at variance with
those of the leadership of tribal government.
Winslow argues that such an approach could be effective in prohib-
iting the physical alteration of sacred sites under the jurisdiction of agen-
cies such as the NPS.239 However, it would be of little avail in situations
such as the Devils Tower climbing management controversy. The trial
court, and even the plaintiffs, readily acknowledged the NPS's authority
to regulate tourist behavior in order to protect the physical integrity of
the site (including wildlife habitat).m° What plaintiffs asserted the NPS
could not do was regulate such behavior in the interests of cultural
preservation.241
But the debate over whether the trust responsibility doctrine or reli-
gion clauses doctrines should have the stronger claim over analysis of
sacred site management tends to obscure the possibility of establishing
an alternative, pluralism-based framework for analysis of these issues.
The concluding section of this article therefore contains recommenda-
tions for the design of multi-cultural consultation processes for sacred
site management planning; and for a step-wise approach to judicial re-
view of those plans, which uses the trust responsibility doctrine as its
alpha, but not always its omega.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
DESIGN AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
PROCESS OUTCOMES
A. MULTI-CULTURAL CONSULTATION AND SITE-SPECIFIC
MANAGEMENT PLANNING
Clearly, the issues surrounding the Devils Tower case have policy
implications for federal land management agencies. There is a growing
236 See Winslow, supra note 114, at 1342.
237 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
238 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
239 See id.
240 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448.
241 See id.
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need for agencies to re-examine their resource protection and preserva-
tion procedures and policies as they apply to areas considered "sacred"
by American Indian groups.
Three factors contribute to the need for this reconsideration. First,
existing legislation and agency regulations focus primarily on properties
of "historic" value. This generally translates into policies that protect
important archaeological sites or historic structures. Often, however,
lands that are considered religiously important to American Indians do
not contain such "fabric"-no archaeological remains or historic archi-
tecture. In fact, places of religious importance to Indian peoples may be
an entire mountain or a valley-landscapes that exhibit no obvious rem-
nant of human activity as viewed by non-Indian observers. While there
are provisions for considering these places for protection as "traditional
cultural properties" 242 under the NIIPA (and its recent amendments), 243
the criteria used to classify these properties are largely, if not entirely,
derived from the NHPA itself, and not necessarily from the perspective
of the communities that define these places as important. A recent Exec-
utive Order directs federal agencies to protect Indian sacred sites to the
extent possible under existing law, but leaves to each agency the task of
designing procedures to ensure this protection.244 However, existing fed-
eral law does not directly address these kinds of cultural properties, and
unresolved First Amendment issues, such as those implicated in the Dev-
ils Tower case, continue to cast a shadow of legal uncertainty over multi-
cultural consultations. Without clear provisions in law, agencies are left
to craft creative solutions from legislation that may not be directly
applicable.
Second, the internal procedures used by agencies to make planning
and resource use decisions do not normally take into consideration the
special relationship they have with federally-recognized Indian tribes.
Too often, Indian tribes are viewed as just another set of special interest
groups, when in fact their unique relationship with the federal govern-
ment under the trust responsibility doctrine, and in some cases as a result
of specific treaty language, gives them a legal status apart from the gen-
eral public. To date, this special status has not translated into a set of
consistent agency procedures (outside of the Bureau of Indian Affairs)
242 NAT'L PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, INTERAGENCY RESOURCES DIVISION,
BULLETIN 38, GuIDELINEs FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL
PROPERTIS. A critical element of this bulletin is the set of guidelines it provides to protect
sites that are of contemporary importance to living communities. Bulletin 38 was the first
serious attempt to deal with properties like Devils Tower, which are seen as having cultural
importance to existing ethnic groups-beyond its value to the earth sciences.
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 1996-1996(a) (1978).
244 See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,772 (1996).
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that recognize this legal relationship and afford consideration of tribal
requests for sacred site protection on non-Indian federal lands.
Third, quite apart from any special legal relationship agencies may
have with tribal peoples, the Devils Tower case points to the need for
agencies to consider how resources are managed and how decisions are
reached in a climate of cultural pluralism. To what extent should (or
can) agencies be "blind" to the ethnic or heritage differences of their
constituent publics? Aside from American Indian tribes, ethnic groups in
the U.S. do not enjoy any unique set of the rights or privileges that are
not shared by the general population. On the other hand, agency plan-
ners and decision-makers who are not knowledgeable and sensitive to the
cultural differences of groups may be unable to avoid conflict that results
from the clash of differing cultural values. While agencies should act in
accordance with law and design procedures that are judged to be fair, the
Devils Tower planning process suggests that there are ways to take cul-
tural differences into consideration in ways that do not conflict with fed-
eral obligations under law. While the outcome was challenged as
unconstitutional, the NPS's procedures for reaching that decision in a
multi-cultural environment were not.
B. JUDICIAL RE viw
Following the advice given above, the first step for an agency con-
templating the conduct of a multi-cultural consultation over sacred site
management planning is to be as explicit as possible concerning the
treaty-based, statutory, and regulatory authority under which the consul-
tation is being conducted. If a recognized indigenous nation, tribe, or
band has any sort of historical use relationship with the site in question,
the trust responsibility doctrine is automatically implicated. The doctrine
then becomes the starting point not only for process design, but for possi-
ble subsequent judicial review as well, at least insofar as a non-Indian
Establishment Clause challenge to the resultant management plan is
concerned.2 45
Also of relevance is the nature and duration of the historical rela-
tionship (including pre-Columbian) between the site in question and
tribes participating in the consultation, as well as the circumstances
under which the tribes were originally divested of unregulated access to
the site. Likewise, it can be helpful to ascertain whether there has been
any effort since such divestiture to use the site for ceremonial purposes.
All of these factors may eventually influence how determinative a role
245 This is the approach followed by the federal appellate courts in Rupert, 957 F.2d 32,
and Peyote Way, 922 F.2d 1210.
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the trust relationship will play in sustaining a possible court challenge to
a specific management plan.
The Supreme Court's pluralistic approach to Establishment Clause
interpretation, as discussed in Robert Post's work,246 was very much on
the minds of the Fifth Circuit judges hearing the 1991 Peyote Way case
on appeal. 247 First, they quoted an earlier Supreme Court decision on the
subject: "[tihe course of constitutional neutrality in [First Amendment
jurisprudence] cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well
defeat the basic purpose of these provisions. '248 They then made the ob-
servation, quoted earlier in this article, to the effect that the trust relation-
ship precludes the degree of separation ordinarily required by the First
Amendment, and then added: "The federal government cannot at once
fulfill its constitutional role of protector of tribal Native Americans and
apply conventional separatist understandings of the establishment clause
to that same relationship." 249
A year later, in a unanimous opinion joined by then-judge Stephen
Breyer, the First Circuit quoted this same language as a basis for its hold-
ing in Rupert.250 These courts recognized the same point made near the
beginning of this article: that spiritual practices are not separable from
other aspects of traditional indigenous cultures, and that trying to vivisect
them into component parts conforming to structural doctrines of the First
Amendment religion clauses is an act that itself severely inhibits the abil-
ity of a tribe to preserve its culture within the context of a dominant
nation-state.
The plaintiffs in the Devils Tower litigation understood this per-
spective, but used it to achieve the opposite effect. They reasoned that if
spiritual beliefs and practices are not structurally separable from other
aspects of Indian culture, then agencies such as the NPS should be pre-
cluded from any activities the purpose of which is to aid in the preserva-
tion of spiritual aspects of tribal culture, since these activities will
inevitably involve the impermissible "teaching" of religion. 251
Were such an argument to ultimately prevail, it would deny the NPS
its ability to teach, a function it has performed to some degree almost
since its inception. It teaches visitors not only about the natural history
of these sites, but about their human history as well. Seen in one light,
then, the Mountain States Legal Foundation's brief for the dissident com-
mercial climbing guides may be regarded as an act of cultural warfare. It
246 See Smith & Manning, supra note 197.
247 See Peyote, 922 F.2d 1210.
248 Id. at 1217 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
249 Id
250 957 F.2d at 35.
251 See Brief for Plaintiff at 22, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-
063-D (D. Wyo. June 8, 1996).
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is an effort to deny visitors to national parks and monuments the opportu-
nity to learn about the cultural pluralism which is so important an ele-
ment of the human history of the United States. It is an effort to suppress
knowledge of the "other"-the minority culture groups who were the
first to develop a relationship with the land, and whose moral claims to
the ability to honor their deities at the sites where they are believed to
reside pre-date by hundreds, or thousands, of years the imposition of the
legal system of the dominant culture that now controls the landscape.
Suppression of knowledge of pre-Columbian and historic indigenous cul-
tures therefore also entails suppressing knowledge of the moral basis for
their undisturbed occasional use of sites they hold sacred in the present
day.
Ideally, NPS interpretive programs provide the public with accurate
cultural and historical information on peoples who once lived and thrived
on what are now park lands. These programs seek to provide the visitor
with an understanding of how the cultural knowledge of these people
provided a means of communication, methods of manufacturing appro-
priate tools, food procurement, finding shelter, or securing a mate. In
general, they provide information on how a group-through the applica-
tions of its cultural knowledge-sustained itself under specific environ-
mental conditions that existed when the park was inhabited.
Because of this, the maintenance of cultural knowledge, or success-
fully passing it along to subsequent generations, is of vital importance to
the survival of the group as a whole. But environmental conditions often
change, and cultural knowledge and behavior adapts to these changes in
ways that allow for the survival of the cultural group. In the face of a
change in environmental conditions many traditions survive and provide
for continuity across generations. Some traditions may change, thus pro-
viding new knowledge that can be successfully used to sustain the cul-
tural group. Consequently, cultural knowledge, and the teaching of this
knowledge or tradition, is of inestimable value, and not just for the sake
of preserving the ancient culture that originated them. Understanding
how human cultures adapt to changes to sustain themselves in the face of
environmental change has applicability to all human groups. Because of
this, cultural knowledge, as it related to national park areas, is a national
treasure as much as the landscapes found within them.252
Sometimes overlooked in our regard for national parks and monu-
ments is the fact that they are also national classrooms. A quick survey
of license plates in any major national park parking lot, or a careful listen
to the accents and languages of visitors, reveals that people from all over
252 For a critical review of related social and anthropological theory, see Roy ELLN,
ENvmo mianr, SuBswrSTcE AND SySTEM: ThE ECOLOGY OF SMALL-ScALE SocIAL FoRmA-
TiONS (1994).
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the nation and all over the world are visiting these sites. We come to
learn about the natural wonders of these places; but we also come to
learn about who we are by learning who we were. The parks are an
inter-cultural crossroads, in part, because they are also crossroads in
time. We encounter our collective past there as an important aspect of
the ongoing task of charting our collective future as a culturally diverse
society.
Some scholars claim that the United States is now entering a somber
and frightening era characterized by what they call a "culture war"253-a
period when the assertion of absolute and mutually incompatible individ-
ual rights is crowding out and shouting down our concomitant efforts to
understand, appreciate, respect, and accommodate the cultural pluralism
that has always been a defining feature of the American experience.25 4
According to some of these same scholars, about all that keeps this war
of words from becoming a war of bombs and bullets is the mitigating and
moderating influences of our institutions (governmental, educational,
commercial, and religious), for it is through these institutions that the
social values of tolerance, respect for difference, and discernment of
commonalities across differences are taught.25 5 Of course, other com-
mentators assert that, in isolated instances, the shooting has already
started, as exemplified by recent acts of domestic political terrorism
committed against family planning clinics, the field offices of western
federal land management agencies, and against federal employees and
their families.25 6
Our national parks and monuments are surely among these mediat-
ing and mitigating institutions. In addition to teaching our pluralist his-
tory through its interpretive programs, inter-cultural consultations such
as the one leading up to the Devils Tower Climbing Management plan
provided an opportunity for parties to the process to teach and to learn
about each other- about who they are, what they value and why, and
how it might be possible to work together to achieve their respective
ends. When it works as expected, such a process can provide not only an
educational function, but also a community building and healing func-
tion. It is a mode of interaction upon which the future of peaceable life
in our pluralistic society may well depend. This is one of the reasons
why it is so important for federal judges to uphold federal agency discre-
253 JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CuLTURE WAR (1991).
254 For a treatise dealing exclusively with the assertion of rights aspect of this phenome-
non, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGms TALK (1991).
255 See RHYs H. Wn.uismS, Cultural Wars, Social Movements, and Institutional Politics,
in CuLT AL WARs IN AmECAN PoLrmcs 283, 284-93 (Rhys H. Williams ed., 1997).
256 See James Davison Hunter, Reflections on the Culture Wars Hypothesis, in THE
Aamuc.AN CuLTua WAGs: CuRREmr CONTEsTs AND FUTUM PRospEcts 243, 249 (James L.
Nolan, Jr. ed., 1996).
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tion-under both the trust doctrine and the First Amendment-to admin-
ister these processes and implement their outcomes, unless those
outcomes are deemed such egregious Establishment Clause infractions
that some mitigation is called for.
From the standpoint of the culture wars hypothesis, it should come
as no surprise that the interpretive program as well as the climbing man-
agement plan at Devils Tower fell under attack in the Mountain States
Legal Foundation's challenge. Its brief represents a fairly overt attempt
at the assertion of cultural dominance-its effect, if not its explicit intent,
being to suppress dissemination of knowledge of our pluralist heritage,
and to homogenize the present in the image of the dominant culture. In
this case, resort to Establishment Clause jurisprudence to trump the trust
responsibility doctrine can be seen as an effort by ideologically moti-
vated plaintiffs to enlist federal judges in this cultural call to arms.
Furthermore, some proponents of the culture wars perspective also
point out that the drive for cultural hegemony on either side is often
accompanied by an economic agenda as well: toward redistributive pub-
lic policies on the part of "progressives," and toward privatization on the
part of "traditionalists. '257 It is worth noting that every Free Exercise
claim the tribes have lost (and they have basically lost all of the land-
based ones, at least in the published cases), has involved a tribal effort to
halt, or at least scale down, privately remunerative uses of public
lands.258 In the Devils Tower case, it was not recreational rockclimbers
who brought the Establishment Clause challenge subsequent to adoption
of the climbing management plan. It was a small group of dissident
commercial climbing guides who might suffer financial loss if even the
voluntary climbing ban were successful; that is, if their would-be clients
developed moral qualms about climbing the Tower once they had been
asked (but not ordered) by the NPS not to. Although questions of cul-
tural dominance are certainly at stake here, it is not difficult to imagine
that these plaintiffs may have been a little less concerned about perceived
government coercion to honor the indigenous deities of Bear's Lodge
than they were about a temporary impairment of their ability to use pub-
lic land for private gain.
We are not asserting here that any interested party or federal jurist
who perceives Establishment Clause implications in a federal agency
management plan that seeks to somehow limit the range of public activi-
ties at a public place in the interest of spiritual accommodation is an
absolutist cultural warrior or an opportunistic privatizer cruising under
First Amendment colors. As defendant-intervenors in the Devils Tower
257 William Hoynes, Public Television and the Culture Wars, in THE AMaucAN CuL-
TuRAL WARs, supra note 145, at 61.
258 See supra notes 131-33, 138.
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case demonstrated, there are plenty of examples of the NPS's accommo-
dation of religious practices at the sites they manage, from the weekly
Christian worship services held in many national parks, to the several
churches that are also national historical sites and monuments, to the
national cemeteries.25 9 At all these sites, non-observant visitor behavior
is regulated in the interest of ceremonial participants. None of this be-
havioral regulation is seen as an establishment of religion, but rather as
equally important accommodation of it, which First Amendment juris-
prudence also encourages.
In similar future situations, there are several fact-specific questions
that agencies should address when drafting sacred site management
plans, and that reviewing courts can use in making their own determina-
tions as to whether review of the plan should be governed only by trust
responsibility doctrine principles, or whether Establishment Clause prin-
ciples have a role to play as well. First, what is the nature of the other-
wise allowable activity that is sought to be limited?2 60 Second, how
restrictive is the proposed limitation?261 Third, over what duration will
the limitation occur?2 62 Fourth, is the limitation solely for the purpose of
cultural preservation, or are there other congruent management objec-
tives being sought as well? 2 63 Finally, what is the impact on third
parties?264
It seems generally that the more pervasive and permanent the pro-
posed restriction on an otherwise allowable non-Indian use of a sacred
site solely on behalf of ceremonial practices preservation, the more
troubling such a proposal has been to the courts, whether it was in the
form of a tribal Free Exercise claim or a non-Indian Establishment
Clause claim. In our view, it is only in cases toward the "pervasive and
259 See Brief for Defendant-Intervenor, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 2d
1448. The brief, submitted by the Indian Law Resource Center, relies on supporting affidavits.
260 This goes to the related issues of how integral to the traditional uses of the park the
activity is, and what percentage of park visitors would be directly affected by the proposed
limitation.
261 That is, how wide an array of activities is precluded and over how long a period of
time.
262 This can be estimated as a percentage of total visitor days.
263 This is not to imply that cultural preservation under one or more of the atonement-era
statutes, implementing regulations, and executive orders described in this article is not a suffi-
cient basis for seeking behavioral limitations-just that there is sometimes strength in multiple
justifications for management planning.
264 The plaintiffs' brief included a complaint that a popular tourist activity at Devils
Tower was watching the rock climbers-something that might be denied them were the plan to
be fully implemented. Conversely, however, there was no consideration at trial of the possibil-
ity that there might be just as many tourists wishing to see the Tower in its pre-Columbian, if
not Edenic state; that is, without climbers using space-age equipment to ascend its many crags
and crevices.
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permanent restrictions solely for ceremonial reasons" 265 end of the con-
tinuum (of which the Devils Tower climbing management plan is not
one) that Establishment Clause principles should properly be implicated.
And even at that end, the "historical traditions" rationale offered in cases
like Lynch266 and Chambers,267 as well as the secular purpose intent of
the trust doctrine itself (in relation to the first of the three elements of the
Lemon test), can provide federal judges with the flexibility they need to
accommodate the cultural preservation goals of a sacred site manage-
ment plan, if indeed it is flexibility that the judge is seeking.2 68
In the end, a great deal will depend on whether a federal judge in a
given case wishes to craft a workable articulation of the trust responsibil-
ity and Establishment Clause doctrines, or instead to simply use the latter
to cancel the former. Judge Downes' decision using purely Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence to uphold accommodation of Indian spiritual
practices on public lands rather than inhibit them is as of yet a rarity.
Judges have many options at their disposal, as this discussion of constitu-
tional pluralism and some related cases make clear. But in disputes im-
plicating both cultural and legal pluralism, it is also true that parties
seeking accommodation of difference face a substantial challenge. For in
the binary world of constitutional adjudication, "they are bringing a con-
flict with the dominant culture into an institution of that same culture
which, while committed to the autonomy of law, rights, and liberties, is
also part of a nation-state committed to the integrity and unity of the
larger body politiC. ' 2 6 9
265 One example is total exclusion, as urged by the Navajo nation in its unsuccessful free
exercise argument in Badoni. 638 F.2d 172 (10"h Cir. 1980).
266 465 U.S. 668.
267 463 U.S. 783.
268 For instance, there is a "historical tradition" of indigenous spiritual observances at
Devils Tower considerably pre-dating its seizure by the dominant culture. See Brief for De-
fendant-Intervenor, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (relying on
supporting affidavits). If the courts can ignore the Lemon test, in allowing state legislatures to
hire chaplains to open working sessions with Christian prayer and local governments to dis-
play Christian creches on public property in the name of historical preservation of Euro-Amer-
ican culture, surely the same deference could and should be granted to the NPS. It is simply
seeking to honor some well-established spiritual practices-historical traditions that pre-date
not only the adoption of the First Amendment, but Columbus' first landfall in the Caribbean as
well.
269 JILL NORGREN Am SERENA NANDA, AMERIcAN CuLTURAL PLURALISM AND LAW 7
(2d ed. 1996). In the federal trial court proceedings, Lakota elders approached the court clerk
to ask if it might be possible for a few of the elders to speak about Devils Tower and its
meaning to them-in the courtroom, but in the absence of the adversarial question and answer
format that the federal rules of civil procedure normally require. See id. What they were
asking for was a chance to speak about the Tower and its important cultural meanings for
Indian peoples in ways that are appropriate to their own context. The court, apparently con-
cerned that it not be perceived as overly accommodative of the wishes of tribal spiritual advi-
sors (as plaintiffs were asserting the NPS had been), denied their request. See id.
BEAR'S LODGE OR DEVILS TOWER
Experience suggests that there are segments of many American In-
dian tribes that generally have no desire to be involuntarily subjected to
such unifying forces, inasmuch as when it has happened historically, it
has usually been to the severe disadvantage of these indigenous nations
within the larger, more dominant nation-state. The challenge for federal
land managers is to find ways to accommodate tribal needs for autonomy
and cultural preservation while simultaneously honoring the Establish-
ment Clause principles discussed in this article. And the task for review-
ing judges is to recognize that, insofar as sacred site management
planning is concerned, it is in the consensus-oriented mutual accommo-
dation of inter-cultural differences by parties in conflict at sacred sites
that the "integrity and unity of the larger body politic"270 in as pluralistic
a nation as ours is actually to be found.
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